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THE' JOURNAL 
OF THE 
ROYAL UNITED SERYIGE INSTITUTION. 
___ -__- 
VOL.  XLVIII. MARCH, 1904. No. 313. 
I dzithors doiw u ~ e  respoiuible for the co?&teirts of their respectice papers.] 
___- ~ _ _  - - -- 
THE ltEPORl' OF  THE TV'Bl t  COilIAlISSION. 
By t l i e  Bight I l o n .  Sir C I I d R L E S  W. UILA-E, Bart., Y.P.  
Friday, 29th January, 1904. 
Sir CLINTON E. DAWAINS, K.C.B., in the Chair. 
THE duty of one who has been asked to read a paper before this 
partly professional assemblage is, in the first place, to frame a brief 
preface to a useful discussion, and in the second to avoid those 
topics tho introduction of whicli would be contrary to tlie traditions 
of the Royal United Service Institution. The most definite part of the 
pronouncements of the Commission concerns the supposed failures of 
civilian politicians to acquaint themselves i i t h  the opinions of their 
military advisers or to act on those opinions. It is .impossible for R 
civilian politician to deal liere with that portion of the case. It  
would be unwise for anyone to do so, and the result would not conduce 
to the value of the discussion, whicli is the main object to be kept 
in view. 
Of the many accounts of tlie work of the Commission which have 
been given to the public, the greater portion have dealt with this 
tabooed branch of tho subject; and the remainder have chiefly dealt 
with a matter which,, although in tho opinion of many the most 
important, I propose to handle last, partly because I am far from being 
convinced that it deserves the foremost place, but chiefly because i t  is 
the one matter which can most usefully be handled in discussion. 
Among tho criticisms of the Commission which are exempt from party 
feeling, we ought, perhaps, to take special account of those which 
have appeared in the great Conservative quarterly and in the great 
Whig quarterly-the Quarter19 Review and tlie E'cZinbrcrgJL Revieic.  
Tho criticism in the Edinburgh Review is anonymous, and is largely 
a defence of the civilian AIinisters who have controlled tlie War Office 
in recent times. It defends tlie civilians indeed by making a lively 
VOL. XLVIII. Q 
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214 THE REPORT OF THE JYAR COXMISSION. 
attack upon the soldiers; but incidentally the Commissioners come ill 
for a good deal of blame. Tho authors of the wrong sighting of 
160,000 rifles, and those responsible for the provision of an immense 
number of rounds of ammunition which could not be used, “may 
deserve to be cashiered.” The oficer who *chose and made Sir John 
French‘s ‘‘ worst possible cavalry weapon ” deserves censure. The 
military authorities are blamed for tho deficitncy of khaki clothiiig. 
The Remount Department is attacked; but it is pointed out that  its 
head was a soldier, and that his immediate chief was a soldier, and 
that Lord Lansdowne and Nr. Brodrick are blamed for military 
faults. Sir Redvers Buller is mado responsible for the telegram to  
the Colonies discouraging mounted men (although in Parliament a 
complete defence of that  telegram on its merits was attempted by the 
civilian Ninister). The military heads of the War Office are held 
respousible for the establishment of the force a t  Ladysmith, a step 
to which the whole collapse of the first part of the campaign is 
referred. have occurred in almost every 
instance under circumstances beyond civilian control.” The Com- 
missioners are shown to have “some serious defect in their minds,’’ 
but have not explained in what it consists; and “disappointment” is 
oxpressed with the whole report, especially on the ground that the 
Commissioners ought to have given their own opinions instead of 
“quotations from the evidence . . . . . A more inconclusive 
document was probably never put before a public hungering for 
precise guidance.” The article concludes with a hostile criticism of 
the minority proposal in favour of an  imitation a t  the War Office of 
the Admiralty Board. The Edinburgh reviewer, in his article,- 
‘‘ The Truth about the Army ”-agrees with the Quarterly reviewer 
indeed in tKo points only, of which this is one, and the other, in which 
we shall all cbncur, is praise of Sir Henry Brackenbury. 
The article in the Quarterly Beview is by my friend Nr. Spenser 
Willrinson; and its title, “ The Cabinet and the War Office,” sufficiently 
implies that, valuable though i t  is, there is some allusion in it to the 
excluded question. The only criticism that I have to make on Nr. 
Spenscr Wilkinson is that  he assumes ‘la demand for an enquiry,” 
and alludes t o  “the time when this enquiry was demanded.” As a 
fact, though this general demand ” was frequently alluded to by 
Lord Salisbury and by Mr. Balfour, it cannot be discovered, 
except in nempaper articles, and the Commission was un- 
doubtedly volunteered. A demand was made‘ in  connection 
with the discussions on the  Army Annual Bill for  ~ o m e  
enquiry, private or public, into the causes of the frequent surrenders in 
the field, which marked the South African alone among our wars. 
For  a long time the promise of this specific enquiry, which was definite 
and made by Nr. Balfour on thrce occasions in’ debate, was kept 
apart from what was frequently described as “ t h e  other o r  general 
enquiry into the war.” Unfortunately, “ tho other” enquiry 
swallowed up the enquiry into the surrenders, and these have been 
dealt with by the Commissioners in a most perfunctory fashion. 
The reason why there was not a public demand for general 
enquiry in December, 1899, was a two-fold one: the public kept its 
head, and wks pleased with &elf for doing so. When thin? were 
a t  the’worst it had, under good Press guidance, the sound belief that  
the causes of things going wrong were simple and clear; would‘ be 
exposed in  Parliament, and would be remedied after the war. Mr. 
‘ I  Scandals ” and “ waste ” 
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THE REPORT OF THE WAR COMMISSION.  215 
Balfour’s explanations in January, 1900, were ill received, but the 
volunteered promises of a general enquiry and the sweeping pledges 
of Army Reform stayed all action, first, till tho long-postponed end 
cf the war, and then till the publication of the Report. 
Mr. Spenser Willrinson, in his article, explains the temper of tlie 
public mind in January, 1900, a t  the time of Mr. Balfour’s speeches 
on the untoward events of the first winter of the war, and again a t  
the time of the General Election, when sweeping-promises were made 
on the subject of Army Reform by all the candidates of all parties, 
as a reason for “ t h e  great cxpectations with which the Report was 
awaited,” but adds with truth, ‘ I  It was impossible for these cxpecta- 
tions to be fulfilled.” It is, as he says, clear that  after the war in which 
the ablest generals had been engaged, either as combatants, or in  tho 
War Office as directors of combatants, a tribunal could not be 
formed which would have combined professional competence with 
disinterested impartiality. H e  adds that  tho Commission recognised 
the restriction imposed on them by the nature of the case, and decided 
not to be influenced by the ideas which had been current among the 
public when the enquiry was promised. H e  then quotes the words of 
the Commissioners a,ci to neglecting demands which might have been 
made upon the Government, but were not embodied in their instruc- 
tions or officially communicated to them. There appears to be a 
reference in these words of the Commissioners to tho misunderstanding 
(breach of faith *it might be called, i f  one wanted to be disagrecablc), 
as to the enquiry into surrenders. When Nr. Balfour caused private 
enquiry to be made whether his suggested words of reference in our 
opinion carried.out his promises, we a t  once showed that the words 
of limitation “ u p  to the occupation of Pretoria” had the effect of 
cuttinc short a promise which upon one point only had been general : 
tlie only point upon which w e  had insisted. It was then 
explained that  the public bearing even of the later surrenders 
would be fully investigated. The Commissioners, on the other hand, 
in an unintelligible passage, seem to suggest that, although the 
Chairman was approached by the Governmcut upon the subject, and 
although we received assurances from the Government after that  
interview, yet the majority of the Commission were justified in taking 
a different view from that which the Government had taken as to the 
course which was to bo followed. This is a pity, as the pledgo was 
obtained on public grounds, to which I shall return, and not from 
motives of curiosity. 
Mr. Spenser Wilkinson goes on to esplain how the Report is 
affected by the restricted interpretation which the Commission placed 
upon the Reference, and the modest opinion which it entertained 
of its own competence.’’ The Commissioners felt thcmselves debarred 
from considering policy, and incapable of resolving questions of 
strategy. Their suggestions became “timid.” M7e may all agree in 
the praise which Mr. Spenser Wilkinson gives to their sincerity, 
impartiality, and considerateness for all concerned. The evidence and 
appendices constitute, as the Quarterly Review points out, the store- 
house in which we have to search for facts; and the Report is a mere 
guide with a few note?, in which no difficult question is decided. 
Mr. Spenser Wilkinson calls them “ t h e  comments of a fair-minded 
jury.” It was a body which contained in its ranks none of those who 
have been strong advocates of Army Reform, No one has a higher 
opinion than I have of the ability of Lord Esher, and of the brilliant 
Q 2  
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216 
power of military organisation which Sir George Taubman-Goldio has 
displayed in Africa; but, mhilo it woufd be possible to go tliroug1, 
all the names with laudatory comment, i t  remains the fact  t ha t  these 
two are the  most advanced reformers wlio were upon the  Commissioll. 
Now, their views are not those of either tlie older or the newer school 
of Army reformers. The one is mainly concerned with tlie details of 
the  change, of doubtful wisdom, proposed by tlie Hartington Com- 
mission, and the other with training t h e  youth of tho whole populatioll 
in t he  use of the rifle; a matter not referred to the  Commission. 
Taking tho Report as we find it, what does i t  come t o ?  The 
Commissioners deal with the  first par t  of the  reference-military 
preparations for t he  war and supply during the campaign-and they 
sum up virtually against the Cabinet in a manner which it  is difficult 
iu  this room to criticise. As regards the  second and final part  of t he  
r e fe renco t l i e  military operations-they give US an immense amount 
of valuable evidence; bu t  for t he  reasons already sketched do not 
attempt to ofier conclusions. On the  whole, they limit themselves 
to their task without going outside i t  in t he  directions which much of 
t he  cvidence suggests. But  on a considerable number of poinls they 
do, in fact, go outside tho narrow view of t he  Referelice. 
THE REPORT. OF THE WAR COMMISSION. 
GENERALS AND OFFICERS. 
The selection of generals, to which all our anxiety for great 
manwuvres points, and as to which in connection with t h e  war there 
was some natural dissatisfaction, is not touched. I n  tlie evidence, 
Lord Kitchener, Lord Roberts, and others esplained the  importance of 
nianuximes. Lord Wolseley, after being told by the  Chairman 
(Q. 9,080) tha t  t he  Commission would not “pass any judgment” on 
“strategy,” was asked a question (9,099), for t he  preparation of 
which the. room had been cleared. It was whether S i r  R. Buller’s 
giving up  the  direct Bloemfontein advance “ was right or  was mroxlg.” 
(Q.  9,101.) The reply was :-“ Well, I thought it was wrong.” . I‘  The 
lestruction of the  cavalry and  transport” (9,102) was the  result. 
The direct advance would, the then Coininniider-in-Chief belicvcd, have 
relieved ICimberley ant1 Litlysmith, and tlie clinnge “ CCI t iinly pro- 
longed tlic war’’ (9,104.) The evidence made i t  clear t ha t  the  
selection of the general to whom the  whole land forces of t he  Empire 
may be entrusted is by  the  Cabinet. The topics suggested in this 
paragraph are obviously of supreme importance, aiid tlic Commission, 
by having “ deliberated in private ” to frame the question, call special 
attention to it, bu t  they do not report upon it. So, too, as regards 
the  training of officers, the Commission have indexed for us very 
valuable evidence. They have not in any way pointed to the  means 
of  supplying the  deficiency of officers, for esample, for cavalry, 
Militia and Volunteers. The new Commission deal with t h e  Auxiliary 
forces-the cavalry difficulty rehains untouched. 
TERMS OF SERVICE. 
I n  dealing with the  supply of men, in the  second part of t he  
Report, the  system of service is naturally avoided; bu t  much of the 
evidence on mobilisation and tlie reserve will’be found to bear upon 
it. The terms of service involve t h e  question whether they should 
be  the  same for all our Regular infantry, or twofold, and, if twofold, 
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T H E  REPORT OB TIIE W A R  COMMISSION.  217 
how fa.r there should be a separation between the home or expe- 
ditionary, and the peace-foreign or Indian force. This question 
raises again that of numbers, and of relative numbers a t  home and 
abroad in peace. 
LINKED BATTALIONS. 
The views of the present Secretary of State for War on the linked 
battalion system will be found in a speech which he  made in second- 
ing an amendment by mc to the Speaker leaving the  Chair on Army 
Kstimates on 25th February, 1898. Replying to Mr. Brodrick, Mr. 
Xrnold-Forster said :-“ The Right Honourable gentleman says that 
it is absolutely out of the question to get rid of it, and that  in order 
to get rid of it you must substitute for it depdts which would be 
enormously expensive. . . I believe that to be a delusive conclusion, 
qrrived a t  by people who do not desire to gee a reasonable system put  
in  force. . . Results which have been obtained in tho Guards and 
Royal Nariiies can be obtained i n  the Line regiments. . . This 
depdt system is convenient for  the infantry. It is admitted that it 
is expedient for the artilleiy, aiid is to be restored, I imagine, prac- 
tically in its entirety before very long for the cavalry.” 
The Commissioners took some evidence incidentally and almost 
accidentally upon matters which bear on the distinction between a 
home service and a foreign service Army, and upon the linked battalion 
system with all its effect u p o ~  numbers and cost; but they have made 
no report upon the subject, and they did not pursue it in their questions 
upon any fixed or general plan, so that  it is impossible, under guise of 
criticising the War Report, to deal with all this largest side of future 
Army Reform. One reason why I pressed for enquirg into the sur- 
renders in South Africa, joining with those who, like Colonel Welby, 
pressed for such enquiry on other grounds, concerning the position of 
..ficers in enquiries and courts-martial, was that, as I explained in 
I’arliament, meeting with general assent, such enquiry ought to tell 
us much in reference to enlistment and esprit  c7e corps. 
SURRENDERS. 
There is some excellent evidence upon the subject from Sir I an  
FIaniilton, but it was volunteered, aiid the matter was not followed up 
by searching questions. The vital point is thus stated by Sir Ian Hamil- 
ton :-‘I A lofty standard of esprit  d e  corps is tlio best safeguard ” 
(Q. 13,941 and 13,978). “Thcre were certain regiments . . who 
practically never had a man taken prisoner during the war. . . they 
were all regiments with a good deal of esprit  c7e corjvs.” The per- 
functory nature of the War Office memorandum handed in and printed 
in the appendix is obvious a t  a glance, and by stopping short a t  the 
occupation of Pretoria it has closed against US the larger portion 
of the field with which enquiry might usefully have dealt. 
COURTS OF EKQUIRY. 
’The CommisSion, after fully stating the nature of Sir Ian Hamilton’s 
evidence, in which lie adniits a few cases of unjustifiable surrender and 
’. a few cases also ” in which, “ altliough ultiinate surrender w i s  i n  
cvitable, there were grounds for the feeling that our troops should have 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
ive
rp
oo
l] 
at 
13
:14
 04
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
15
 
218 THE REPORT O F  THE WAR COYHISSION. 
held out longer than they did,”‘ merely state that  “ There is no reason 
to suppose that the great majority of surrenders were due to any want 
of spirit in officers.)’ This is an amazing exnniple of deliberate omission. 
“ Want of spirit i n  officers ” has hardly been allegd except in two or 
three notorieus cases. It  was not the ground given, in any of the 
debates which took place in the House of Commons, for the necessity 
for the enquiry, which was admitted, and other grounds were given 
which made i t  an enquiry likely to be fruitful in good results 
as regards Army Reform. To the whole of this case the Com- 
missioners have wilfully given the go-bye. On the other side of 
the question, which was raised by Colonel Welby and Mr. Lambert in 
the House of Commons, they have merely stated that  Courts of 
Enquiry were invariably held in accordance with Army Regulatiorc and 
they have named the change introduced in 1901 by Lord Roberts. 
Upon this subject the Commissioners have not even discharged the 
useful function which in the necessary failure of their Report has 
bccn cheerfully acknowledged as regnrds every other matter. Thero 
is no evidence upon the subject which is really followed up. 'lie 
loss of the great convoy a t  Waterval Drift, described by Colonel 
Clayton, now Assistant Quartelmaster-General a t  Head-Quarters, who 
had been in command of the Army Service Corps, as a ‘‘ terriblc blow ” 
(Q. 2,685), is only named in a list of 225 enquiries, of which 217 are 
followed by the word “ Exonerated,” as follows :-‘‘ The convoy of 200 
wagons was captured-on the morning of the 16th.” One man, captured 
on the previous day, was I‘ not exonerated.” That is all, concerning 
.the worst disaster, judged by results, which has happened to US in our 
time. 
I n  the appendis there is a schedule of surrenders, and an account 
of twelve important surrenders previous to the occupation of Pretoria : 
that  is up to Heilbron, 4th June, 1900. This omits consequently 
about forty surrenders, in each of which more than 100 prisoners 
were taken by the Boers, o r  more than two-thirds of the whole 
number of the principal surrenders of the war. Among those 
which would have thrown light upon our military system it omits 
Rhenoster Bridge or Roodevaal of the 7th June, where an entire 
mixed force, with enormous stores, was captured by theeBoers. It 
omits the surrender of the 11th July, known as Nitral’s Nek, Uitval’s 
Nek, Mazillikat’s Nek, or Silikatze’s Nek, which is of first-class im- 
portance, not only for  the usual reasons, but. also on account of its 
bearing on the procedure of Courts of Enquiry. This was the  case which 
was most fully discussed on tyo  occasions in debates started by Colonel 
Welby in the House of Commons. It is the one case of a surrender 
whicli is thought important for tactical reasons by tlic author of tlic 
latest book on the war, who gives to it two pages in his first chapter.’ 
Two guns and 190 men werc taken, close to the headquarters of the 
k m y ,  and in a position which compromised its wholc situation. An 
iniprmal Court of Enquiry was held a t  oncc in tho absence of the 
prisoners. Tho colonel in command was placed on half-pay, and 
another colonel also. I n  this case the formal enquiry was held months 
afterwards, when the prisoners were recovercd. On that  occasion the 
proceedings of the first o r  informal Court were referred to the formal 
Court, and the formal Court merely upheld the finding of the first or 
informal Court, but  added the important rider that  they had not 
‘&Some Lesons:from’the Boer \Tar,” by;Colonel I’ilcher, pp. 20-21. 
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THE REPORT OF THE WAB COMMISSION. 219 
before them the orders given to the colonels whose conduct was in 
question. As this case was that  upon which the promise of enquiry after 
thc war was given, it is ail amazing fact that  it is absolutely excluded 
from the Commissioners’ proceedings. Among the other surrenders, 
conccrniiig which the Commissioners have not even given tabulated 
results are the second Dewetsdorp, of November, 1900, when two gum 
and 450 men were taken under circumstances which certainly deserved 
enquiry; Nooitgedacht, of the 13th Decembcr; Helvetia, of the 29th 
December; Nodderfontein, of the 30th January, 1901 ; Wilmansrust, 
of June, 1901 ; Vlakfontein, of 19th September, 1901 j Tweefonteiu, of 
24th December; not to speak of well-known engagements, such as the 
surprise known as Utrecht or Blood River Poort, 17th September, 1901, 
and Brakenlaagte, 30th October, which were t h e  subject of reports 
which were laid before Parliament. A t  tho same time, known as are 
somc of these cases, further enquiry into the conduct, for example, of 
the infantry of Benson’s rearguard, and of ‘‘ the niountcd troops ” to 
whom Lord Methuen’s fortunes had to be entrusted on the 7th March, 
1902, mould have been desirable. The case of the 30th October 
involved the surrender only of a company, and is the smallest of t h o s e  
about sixty in number-of which scparato record has been kept by me, 
but was more important than many of the larger ones involving the loss 
of guns and of several hundreds of mcn each, on account of its bearing 
upon discipline. It is useless to pretend that the disagreeable side of these 
iucidents is not already known, and is consequently best concealed. 
Lord Kitcliener, for example, reported, on the operations of Colonel 
Ternan in the North-western Orange River Colony, that  a patrol of 
200 men, under Major Luard, being attacked, “ after an engagement 
which ,re5ected very little credit upon many of our men, the majority 
of the patrol were captured by the enemy.” That report was laid 
before Parliament in a Blue Book. This step having once been taken, 
surely i t  would have been both wise and just to clear up the reflection 
by enquiry. It mas promised, and it was expected, that the Com- 
missioners should do so. As regards discipline, and apart from actual 
surrenders, Mr. Amery, the Times representative and historian of thc 
mar, whose facts were not otherwise shaken, mas contradicted by the 
generals as to his account of the “ disorderly retirement of the cavalry ” 
a t  the battle of Ladysmith (Q. 20,440). A more useful or a more 
satisfactory conclusion would have been reached if other witnesses had 
been called upon this battle of‘‘ Mournful Nonday,” and especially 
with regard to the behaviour of the infantry. “If the Boers had 
really pressed . . . . . it might have been a bad business.” 
(Q.  13,870.) 
GUERILLA. 
Not only did the limitation of the date to the occupation of 
Pretoria shut out some of the surrenders from the circumstances of 
which most might have been learned in reference to enlistment, 
officering, training, and esprit d e  corps, but i t  also excluded another 
important side of war, highly interesting, but less necessary. to be 
dealt with a t  the moment than is that  to whicli allusion has already 
been made: whether .the plan of dealing with guerilla which mas 
actually pursued rras the right one ; whether our generals showed 
that, they had fiuficicntly studied partisan war and mountain war. 
This is only notcd by me for the purpose of sholying that i t  is not 
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220 THE REPOIIT OF THE \YAB CO?dMISSION. 
forgotten, and to pay what I think is a deserved tribute to the studies 
which have been promoted by papers and’by speeches in this room 
by Dr. Niller Naguire and other masters of the question. It is oftea 
assumed that the South African theatre of war was so gigantic, and 
the Boers such admirable partisans, that  our difficulties were the 
greatest ever met with. Sir Evelyn Wood, Colonel Altham, and 
others (Q.  599, 600) had told the Government what to expect. Colonel 
Spence, who mas trained, I think, under Sir William Butler, was kept 
a t  Nalta until the term of his service expired. He, to judge by his 
two papers on the subject, one of wliich was read before the war, 
thoroughly grasped the application to the conditions of the Boers iu 
South Africa of the principles laid down by General Davidoff. 
Dr. iUiller Naguire, with immense knowledge, has developed Davidoff’s 
principles, and all of us have read the details of partisan warfare is 
Algeria and Nesico. The distances in Algeria with which PLSeaud 
had to contend were almost as great as thoso of South Africa, and 
his other difficulties far greater, as he had to deal with every fighting 
man in a population of nearly 4,000,000, almost all skilful in arms. 
Dr. Niller Alaguire has admirably examined the cases of the-Caucasus 
and of Bosnia, and has shown that our relative resources were much 
greater in proportion to the Boer. guerilla than those which existed 
on the side of tlie Regular Armies in any previous cases, Vende‘e, 
Algeria, and 31esico in particular. 
THE LATER YEOMANRY. 
The Commissioners have also failed to go beneath the surface 
in attempting to clear up by their Report, while illustrating by. the 
ovidence, the question a t  issue between the soldiers in the field and 
the War Office, as to the scandals which marked the hasty recruiting 
of tee  variegated bodies collected a t  home and in tlie Colonies to serve 
as mounted troops in the later portion of the war. Lord Raglan 
and Mr. Balfour used the same language upon the subject in the 
House of Lords and House of Commons, Lord Raglan’s reported words 
being ‘‘ The military authorities asked those troops to go into action 
prematurely.” Mr. Balfour, on the 22nd January, 1902, said that 
“ The military authorities in South Africa asked those troops to go 
into action prematurely.” On the other hand, Lord Uethueii wa3 
supported by all the soldiers in tlie statements which he made as to 
the operations in the field beiug compromised by the way in which 
these men, many of them wholly without training, were crowded 
upon columii-cominnndersianders to be their mounted troops. Lord Raglan, 
in defending the Government upon the subject in tlie House 
of Lords, stated that the percentage “discovered to bc in- 
efficient and returned to this country was esceedingly small 
- under five per cent.” Lord Stanley stated in the House 
of Commons that  1,800 were sent back, of whom 350 were 
returned I‘ as incompetent and inefficient.” Of their officers, “some 
had indifferent records as privates in tlie first contingent” (Q. 7,163). 
“I  see, with disgust, that  three of my most iueficieiit privates have 
been given commissions.” Aiiotlier was (Q .  7,1G4) n private “ from 
the 4th nussars . . . B habitual drunkard.” “ Aiiotlier of the 
officers was taken by the police as an old illicit diamond-buyin,o 
offellder” (Q.  7,185). “ W e  sent home about 100 officers” (Lord 
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Chesham, 6,732). The subject was one of those upon which i t  was 
specifically promised tha t  tlie Commission should report, and they 
cannot be said to have done so in their own words and on their own 
responsibility. But, on the other hand, it cannot be contended tha t  
tlie matter has the same continuing importance as has that of tlie 
officering and training and discipline of the Regular infantry and 
cavalry, as illustrated by the history of the surrenders in the field. Of 
these we a11 think what the  Commander-in-Chief said ( Q .  9,327) :- 
“They were not creditable to the Army.” 
CAVALI~Y AND ~ I O Z ~ N T E D  INFAKTI~T. 
One of the most important subjects handled a t  length in the  
Report is tliat which is described as “ t l ie  use of cavalry a n d  other 
mounted forces.” The Commissioners rightly tell us tliat most of Ihe 
witncsses a re  of opinion that ’‘ an Army should contain a m ~ c h  larger 
proportion of mounted men than  formerly.” The Army reformer6 in 
Parliament have for many yeprs pointed out t he  reduction in the  
number of horses kept up by us, although the  strength of the  Army 
had been increased. The tendency to discourage Regular cavalry 
continues, and.i t  seems now to be tliouglit that  Yeonianry, in spite of 
the words quoted from Lord Roberts as to iniperfcctly trained troops, 
may be  relied upon as the cavalry of army corps. The Commissioners 
do not attempt to settle the character of t he  increased mounted foFces 
which they evidently think ought to be kept up. They quote strong 
opinions upon all sides. The  name which perhaps on the whole 
carries the  most weight upon this question, namely, that  of Colonel 
Haig, is not quoted; but his evidence is of great importance on the  
cavalry side. The Commissioners state t ha t  t he  prevailing opinion 
is t ha t  cavalry should still be armed and trained for shock tactics, 
b u t  should be  more carefully trained than  heretofore to fight with 
a rifle on foot, and tha t  there should also be available a considerable 
force of mounted riflemen, who should, in fact, be cavalry not using the  
sword or lance. They state t ha t  Lord Aletliuen, General Pole-Carew, 
and some other witnesses were in favour of having permanent regi- 
ments of mounted infantry; but the  Commission seein on the  whole to 
side with those whose names carry perhaps lesi meig.ht, who are in 
favour of the  present system of training mounted infantry drawn 
from infantry battalions. There is no subject on which foreign 
opinion contained in the  best foreign criticisms of our South African 
war is more unanimous tliaii on the increased need for Regular 
cavalry. The Germans are increasing their cavalry. The Russian 
cavalFy is already extraordinarily numerous. The French are showing 
no tendency to alter tlie nature of their cavalry. The matter has 
already becn discussed in this room on a paper by Major Seely, Sir 
John  French being in tlie Chair. On tha t  occasion Sir  John French 
quoted Von der Goltz in favour of keeping up as many mounted 
troops as our horse supply mill permit. Sir  Jplin French added tha t  
irregular mountcd troops cannot undertake tlie T6Ze of cavalry.” 
The Americans are a practical people, and we rend with interest a 
recent letter by the  well-kiiowi Freiicli Colonel Picquart, wlio is one of 
t he  highest authorities wlio ever were upon the  French staff, and wlio 
told tlie Tinzrs tha t  the large proportion of cavalry in the Army of 
the  United States is explained by the fact t ha t  “ volunteer infantry 
can be improvised," while cavalry cannot : “ the  Regulars have theii 
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222 THE REPORT O F  THE WAR C04IMISSION. 
to supply the volunteers with the necessary amount of cavalry.” I n  
proportion to our total numbers we are the least provided with cavalry 
of all the  Powers, and the American argument applies to us. 
I n  his memorandum on the abolition of the lance, Lord Roberts 
explained that we must endeavour to obtain “ improvement in the 
use of ‘the sword, in which our men are far from being proficient.” 
He  complained of “insufficient training of the individual,” and 1le 
gave this counsel of perfection, that  even. the lance could not wisely 
“ b e  entirely discarded,” for ‘ I  the cavalry soldier should have a 
knowledge of all weapons which may be effectively used by the mounted 
man.” It is quite certain that  even Lord Roberts, who is popularly 
supposed to be “against cavalry,” knows better than to express any 
such opinion, and lie, indeed, concludes his memorandum by the 
classical statement that  the issue of a campaign may depend on the 
judgment of a cavalry officer. It is clear from his last paragraph 
that  he thinks that the officering of the cavalry might be improved, and- 
he adds as his very last words, “Without  first-rate cavalry leaders 
and thoroughly well-trained men, good strategy is most difficult, ’and 
decisive tactics almost impossible.” The public has perhaps some right 
to complain that the Commission, when deciding as they do in  favour 
of an  increased mounted force, should not have given that warning 
as to its nature in which all the principal witnesses. agreed. 
One of the most painful facts about the war, which Lord Roberts has 
frankly faced, but t h 6  Commissioners have not, is that  in the later 
stages of the war the Boers adopted cavalry tactics and beat us a t  
them. Lord Roberts has written that “Cavalry . . . . . rely 
uponsurprise . . . . and although the . . . plains of South 
Africa were peculiarly ill-adapted to those tactics, there were occasions, 
utilised more often by the Boers than by ourselves, when startling 
surprises wore effected.” Lord Roberts adds words which show that 
he does not separate himself from foreign critics when he says that 
in European war opporthit ies for cavalry will be more frequent. 
Therc could be no such an  opportunity for cavalry as that which would 
Le affordod by thc presence in  the field, as the cavalry of Army Corps, 
of half-trained mounted infantry. There is no cavalry in the world 
which puts so few men in the field per reginlent as does ours, even in 
India, where it is, comparatively speaking, efficient. The cavalry should 
of all arms be the most professional, the most highly trained. The 
war appears to have- shown that our own cavalry, which with its 
longer service ought to be a model to the world, does not compare 
favourably with our own Indian cavalry, or even with foreign cavalry 
with a much shorter term of service. Ono of thc ablest foreign 
observers of the war, Colonel Camille Favre, of the Swiss Army, 
founding himself upon the Prussian military ‘ I  Considerations on the 
\Var in  South Africa.” and other high Continental authorities, says that, 
instead of the system which we propose, all Continental nations will 
prefer to increase the numbers of their Regular cavalry. Wc might 
virtually increase our numbers by ceasing to withdraw from, cavalry 
work, constant training and high efficiency, as we do even in India, 
costly cavalry privates, to turn them into gardeners and waiters. This 
withdrawal is startling also in the infantry. The Adjutant-General 
(Q. 4,562) says that onethird of each infantry battalion are constantly 
a t  work which is not soldier’s work, they get no training, and tht 
practice “will lead to disaste-,” A t  the same time, the results are 
Pven worse in the case of cavalry, and it is impoGible to feel eontent 
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THE REPORT OF THE T A R  COMMISSION.  223 
with the cavalry in the South African war. Lord Esher 
states that  a t  an early stage Lord Roberts had removed all 4 brigadiers 
and 11 out of 14 Commanding Officers of cavalry (Q. 4,297 and 4,299). 
I n  another part of the evidence different figures were given, whicli 
again tell heavily against the cavalry : (Q. 10,520) I‘ You removed six 
brigadiers of cavalry, one brigadier of infantry, five commanders of 
cavalry regiments, and four commanders of infantry battalions 3 ”- 
‘‘ Yes.” 
It is now possible to return to  a subject which follow that of the 
Regular Army in the second section of the Report, dealing with the 
supply of men, as I have anticipated the remarks as to Yeomanry, which 
come later still because they cannot wA1 be separated from those on 
cavalry ‘‘ and other mounted forces,” which are dealt with a t  an earlier 
point in the Report, and consequently by me to-day. 
MILITIA. 
AS the organisation of the Blilitia and Volunteers (omitting, with 
stupendous inconsequence, the Yeomanry) has been referred to another 
Royal Commission, i t  seems a pity that  the War Commission should 
have expressed any opiiiion uponethe subject of the BIilitia. That 
Commission has been so timid as regards tlie expression of opinion 
nn other points that  it i s t h e  more startling to find it doing the harm 
that i t  has done by its words in reference to a sensitive and often 
ill-used body. It would perhaps he best, as tlie Commission on the 
Militia and Volunteers is sitting, that we should make no reference to 
the subject; but it is difficult to adopt this course in face of the 
proceedings of the Commissioners themselves. The Commissioners did 
not specially represent the Nilitia and Volunteers. They a s k d  
questions and obtained opinions “adverse to tlie . . . efficiency 
of the Militia” from Lord Wolseley and the Adjutant-General. They 
quoto in the Report pretty much everything which was said against 
the Militia by the witnesses, and their words cannot but be read by 
the uninstructed public as though they blamed tlie Nilitia for faults 
for which the authorities \vho liad had tlie control of the Nilitia are 
presumably responsible. . Young subalterns of Militia, for example, 
were suddenly drawn from their battalions for the Regulars, and tlie 
best of their men were taken a t  the same time for the Regular Army 
in tlie Militia Heserve. I n  some cases the Line battalion, which is 
praised, received a considerable number of Nilitia officers from the 
Militia battalion of the same county, and received a couple of hundred 
of tlie best BIilitiamen from tlie Militia unit, which was afterwards 
credited with a considerable number of tlie boys or otherwise ineffective 
men nominally belonging to tlie Line battalion. It hardly meets the 
facts to give general praise to tlie Line battalion and general blame 
to the Militia battalion. The Militia officers were not called as wit- 
nesses, because the new Commission liad been appointed. Under these 
circumstances, i t  seems unfair to give the hostile evidence of those 
representing the Regular Army and the War Ofice who were called. 
The public sido of this criticism is that  tho words used by the Com- 
missioners tend to prejudge the question wliicli has bcen referred to 
the otlier Commission, and to discredit what may be called thf 
principle of Militia, service. The evidence, for example, of Lora 
Roberts, is quoted as though i t  were evidence against Militia in the‘ 
abstract, when, alluding to the capture of the Derbyshire BIilitia, 
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224 THE REPORT O F  THE \VAII C O M M I S S I O N .  
and of the  so-called Irish Yeomanry, he  says tha t  cases of small detacli- 
ments “both  of Militia and Yeomanry . . . .. showed what a 
danger it was to depend upon troops who were not thoroughly 
disciplined and properly trained.’! It would be quite possible to pick 
out  many of the great number of indefensible surrenders of tlie war, 
and to base on them an attack upon tlie infantry and cavalry of the 
Regular Army. Lord Roberts, of course, meant only what lie said; 
but the  Commissioners have used his answer in such a fashion tha t  
i t  becomes a n  attack upon the  Nilitia principle. We have only to 
remember tha t  the Swiss Aimy is a Nilitia, and to bear in mind the  
opinion of tho efficiency of tlie Swiss Army which Noltlce formed, to 
know tha t  a high standard of disciplilie and training can be reached 
under a Afilitia Service, such, for example, as t ha t  of the  Swiss field 
artillery. 
After tlie second section of the Report, dealing witli the supply 
of men, we come to a third section dealing, among other matters, with 
ammuuition and equipment, iiicluding supplies of material. It is 
difficult to detach this matter, as the. Commissioners have detached it, 
from tlie treatment under Section 1 of tlie Report of tha t  which they 
call “Deficiencies in Stores,” and in order to avoid dealing wit11 i t  
twice I have kept i t  for this point. 
ARMAMENTS AND DEFICIENCY I N  STORES. 
I n  my opinion, t he  public have been rightly led by the military 
critics of their papers to attach the  highest importance among all the 
subjects treated in the  four volumes to Sir  Henry Brackenbury’s 
memorzndum, dated on the  day of t he  battle of Colenso, in which he 
states t ha t  on taking up his appointment as Director-General of 
Ordnance he  found tha t  our armaments, reserves of guns, ammunition, 
and stores, and power of output of ammunition, were such as to be 
‘‘ full of peril to tlie Empire.” There has been no attempt by anyone 
to dispute eitlier his general statement or tlie details by which it is 
accompanied. Yet it should be remembered that,  from tlie time of 
tlic Stcplien Commission, successive Secretaries of State and successive 
Prime Ministers have. assured tlie country t h a t  while there had been 
now ” we 
were in a perfect position as regards all tlie points with wliicli Sir 
Henry Brackenbury deals. A question by Sir Henry Norman brought 
out “ tlie natural tendency of a man in office . . . to take a roseate 
view.” The Secretary of Statc for War of the  present 
Government (Q.  21,280), however, tells us : ‘ I  The war brought 
to light the melancholy extent of our deficiencies . . . full of 
peril to the  Empire.” Not only in tlie United Kingdom, but in the 
Empire, this matter of the  deficiency of stores still nceds close attention. 
I n  a speech by the  Ninister of Nilitia and Defence of Canada, 
delivered in the Dominion House in October last and published by 
the Minister, lie said of tlie Dominior: “There  are less than 40,000 
rifles in this country.” When we consider our  boasts as to the number 
of the  Canadian Militia, military men can judge of the  
position of tha t  portion of the  Empire, linppily unlikely to be attacked, 
but spending a good deal of money upon its organisation. The then 
Commandant of tlie Forces in New Zealalid, in his evidence (Q. S,658), 
says : -“ I n  tlie Colony there was no reserve supply of storcs- a t  all. . . . The people of tlie Cololiy look on tlie Defence r o t e  wit11 
. deficiencies in  the  past, those had been mado up, and that 
(Q. 9,365.) D
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THE REPORT OF THE \YAR COMMISSION. 225 
But in this country Parliament has clieerfully voted great suspicion” 
wxythiiig which has been asked for stores, even Ly the War Ofice. 
Q.F. GUNS. 
A matter connected with arinaments, in which the Coniiiiission 
have failed to give good guidance, concerns our backwardness in field 
?uns. Lord Roberts’s opinion is quoted to the effect that  we were 
behind other nations, and that our gun was wanting in rapidity of 
lire; after which the Commission proceed to take, for them, the 
musual course of placing their own opinion on record, and it is in 
defiance of that  of Lord Roberts, and of truth. They declare that 
“ I t  would . . . . be unjust to say that the field armament 
. . . . . was inferior to that  which was in use by other great 
nations.” What they mean, apparently, is expressed in Sir Henry 
Brackenbury’s statement that  up to 1899 “ n o  European Power had 
got a real quick-firing guu except France.’’ The Commission go on, 
iiowevei; to state that  in the course of the war the War  Office obtained 
from German makers some “real quick-firing guns.” Now there can 
be no doubt whatever as to tho facts. The debates in the House of 
Commons before tlie war elicited the fact that  other peoplo had, and 
that we had not, a quick-firing gun, and some of us were able to state 
the date at which our Govemment had refused a quick-firing gun. 
Colonel Camille Favre, mlio is himself an  artilleryman, quotes in his 
writings on the war “The  Prussiaii Military Considerations on the 
War in South Africa ” :-“ The English guns are old and old-fashioned. 
Supplied with a spade attachment, these guns obtain results very 
inferior to those of quick-firers. . . . . The English had only one 
field battery which was Q.F. except their pom-poms.” Colonel Camille 
Favre adds, on his omn account, that  the Boer artillery had 126 Q.F., 
but failed on acpount of their defective sliell. Our gun is still a t  this 
moment the ’%, converted in 1893, with only an infinitesimal gain 
from the change from an action on one side to an action on the other, 
with a spade attachment added in 1899, and it is still so hopelessly 
inferior not only to the French gun but  to tlie guns in course of being 
provided by the smaller Poiyers, that tho latest full document on the 
subject, Rapports sur les Ellides et Essais pour l e  Rtarinenient de 
Z’ArtiZZerie (Berne : Haller, 1903), shows that, apart from the French 
gun, the Krupp gun of commerce is to our gun as 7 to 1, a battery of 
our guns being distinctly inferior to a single Q.F. When we find the 
Commission suggesting that  the French is the only true Q.F. and is a 
secret, we may confidently reply that the Icrupp gun of 1901, which is 
for sale to anyone in the open market, is 7 times as rapid in its aimed 
fire as is our own. 
IKTELLIGEI~CE. 
‘The fourth section ,of the Report deals with War Office organisa- 
tion, and points out tlie deficiencies of our Government in connection 
with the Intelligence Department, which are already notorious, and 
wliich are perfectly set forth in the evidence and the Returns of Sir 
William Nicholson. 
DECENTRALISATION. 
The last matter upon which the Commissioners record their 
No one will complain of their opinion concerns Decentralisation. 
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words, for they endorse the policy of Sir Clinton Dawkins. They point 
out, however, certain special British difficulties in tho way, without 
alluding to those dificulties whicli are perhaps the greatest of all. 
I n  the evidence of Sir Williain But.ler before Sir Clinton 
Damkins's Comniittee ov War Office organisation (8,456), Sir 
\Villiam Butler points out that  one form of decentralisation, and i t  is 
that  which is extended by A h .  Brodrick's scheme, takes away the general 
and his stall from the duty of training, and from their military duties 
generally, and involves them in perpetual desk work a t  adniinistrative 
detail. The inspection of rifle ranges and the consideration of sites, 
plaus, specifications, and dealing with tenants, illustrate the diffi- 
culties of complete decentralisation. I may perhaps be allowed 
to refer to some enquiries which I have myself recently made 
upon the subject. Having defended War Ofice espenditure in 
certain bays in Ireland, and having had doubts upon the subject 
afterwards, I thought I would look round for myself. The questions 
which I asked in Ireland led me to find certain further difficulties in 
the army corps plan of decentralisation. There is, for cxample, con- 
siderable expenditure under the U7ar Ofice upon forts, guns, and 
garrisons in the neiglibourhood of Queenstown, or let us say Cork 
Harbour. There is \Var Office expenditure upon fortifications in the 
Scilly Islands, which in some degree compete with the stations in 
South Ireland. There is similar expenditure a t  Bere Island, in Bantiy 
Bay. The selection of guns involves the whole question of what each 
of these spots is nieant for, and incidentally involves a possible choice 
as a coaling station for cruisers betmeen Berehaven, which is in the 
right place, but where there is no railway, and Quecnstown, which is 
possibly not necessary if Bantry Bay is made sufficient. B u t  these 
questions, which, under centralisation, were settled on the advice of coni- 
petent persons a t  the War  Office, are now in part  rcferred to supposed 
local authorities a t  the Curragh, or, in the case of the Scilly Islands, 
a t  Salisbury, who have no probable competence on the p o i n d u n -  
doubtedly no certain competence-and no professional advisers. The 
result can only be delay, or, if everyone conrerned is not an angel, 
friction. 
CONSTITUTION O F  THE 1l7AR OFFICE. 
I t  was pointed out above that the only important point of agree- 
ment between the Quarterly and the Edinburgh reviewers of the 
IEcport of the War  Commission concerns the minority proposal, which 
has been virtually accepted by the Government in being referred to a 
body of three under the chairmanship of its author. I f  I add that I 
agree in this matter, not with the Government, not with the politicians 
who, with one accord, have accepted the suggegtion, which appears to 
have the support of the best friends of the  Army upon the Liberal 
side, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Rosebery, Mr. Asquith, as well as of the 
administration, but  with the two reviewers, I must add words which 
guard that statement. The body of three to which Lord Esher's 
proposal is referred contains two men evidently selected by Mr. Arnold- 
Forster, for they arc known to have his confidence in a hi@ degree, 
as they deserve it, Sir John Fisher for the Navy, and Sir George 
Sydenliam Clarke for the Military Service. It is certain that  any 
recommendation proceeding from the fertile administrative brain of 
Lord Esher, yhich passes the detailed examination of Sir John Fisher 
and Sir George Clarke, followed by that of Mr. Arnold-Forster and 
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of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, will bo it proposal which will 
cio no harm. The author of a newspaper lesdcr, who may possibly be 
identical with Nr. Spenser Wilkinson, has summed up his opinion in 
words in which we limy all agree : -“ A Board is better than an in- 
competent Minister, but  hardly so good as a competent one.” Per- 
souafly, I prefer tho proposal niado in the first editiori of “ Imperial 
Defence” in 1592, by Blr. Spenser Wilkiiison and myself, or that  
which is now b&ng revived by Colonel Pollock, being the 
1S9@ plan of Lord Randolph Churchill. It is that there 
should be a single Minister, with authority over both Services, 
having under him the Army Millister and the Navy Ninistcr, 
and their Parliamentary assistants. I have, moreover, frequently 
suggestad that we never should obtain tha t  revolutionary Army reform 
for which I havo always contended unless a Prime Minister 
would for a time himself take both departments, or a t  least give the 
whole weight of his,authority to tho Ninister or Ministers charged with 
them. Mr. Balfour, in  the new foriii of the Cabinet Committee of 
Defence, and in the peranal change which ho has made a t  the War 
Office, appears disposed to carry out in practice the view for which 
in principle I have contended. It is a pity that  he should niis up his 
action, which we shall all think sound, with defence of past Cabinet 
preparation for war against either the War Commission on the one 
side, or predecessors in ofiice on the other. A t  all events, in this room 
we must consider these questions ii. Z’UCZIO. I f  a Prime Ninister is 
competent for his place he must, under any system, be the real Minister 
of War, deciding on the relative expenditure upon Army and Navy 
respectively, by consideration of the nature of the wars in which the 
Empire is likely to be engaged. Boards, whether a t  the Admiralty 
or a t  the War  Office, cannot settle for the country the first-class 
questions. W h e n  it  is suggested that we aro to imitate thc Admiralty 
in the War Office, we have to  ask what it  is tha t  we are to imitate. The 
duties of the various Lords of the Admiralty were left undefined from 
tho time of the amendment of Nr. Childers’ arrangements by Lord 
Georgo Hamilton. I n  consequence of this fac t  the Service members of 
the House of Commons wero solicited by their two civilian members, 
Mr. Arnold-Forster and myself, in the spring of 1896, to submit a 
resolution to the House of ,Commons upon tho subject, and on the 11th 
March, at the wish of our collcagues, Nr. Arnold-Forster moved 
for  an  assurance that the Estimates were “based upon s 
consideration of the needs of possible war . . . . . and upon 
the consideration of advico tendered in  that  behalf by the naval officer 
selected for the conduct of naval operations in the case of war.” That 
is Mr. Spenser Wilkinson’s principle of the “ single naval adviser ” 
and single military adviser ” : tho very negation of a Board of War!  
The then Liberal Administration met u s  and replied that the oflicer 
we asked for was the First Naval Lord, whose duty i t  was to “ advise 
the department as to the conduct of operations in war. He should 
have control of the general organisation of affairs.” If hIr. Arnold- 
Forster retains his view, of which I make no doubt, concecsion to the 
general, but  uninstructed, public opinion in favour of th’e imitation a t  
the War Office of the Admiralty Board can do no harm. It is a 
peace device intended to prevent friction, and cannot seriously impede 
the operations of mar themselves. If it were proposed to go beyond the 
mere creation of a new Board and to abolish the office of Commander- 
in-Chief, I should agree with the Quarterly reviewer, that  to do so 
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would bc to igiioro tlie spirit of military institutions, ivliicli rcquircs 
t ha t  the military authority over the coinbatant forces shouM be united 
ill n. single military personage iiiidcr tho  control of the  civil GQverii- 
Incnt of the State; t ha t  before war and iii war therc must be a principal 
conimmder selecting the  ofliccrs for tlie work tlicy have to do; that  
if t he  great ofice were abolished there would still be under one name 
or  another a favouiite general of preeminent influence, bu t  tha t  he 
would be surrounded by more jcalousy and intrigue than would naturally 
be t he  case uiidcr a plainer plan. We  shall all agree tha t  wars cannot 
be coiiducted by Boards, aiid a Cabinet beiug a Board, the incursions 
of Cabinets into the  operations of war, whether during the  Peninsular 
War  or since, liave not been to  the  advaiitage of t he  country. 
Considered as a peace organisation, tho  Board is hardly likely to 
sntisfactory to soldiers, as it must throw on the  civilian Secretary of 
State more detailed authority over the Army than lie possesses now, 
and especially if tlie imitation of t h e  Admiralty Board is ac- 
companied by the abolition of the office of Commander-inchief. 
lve may agree with the Edirzbzirgh reviewer tha t  the analogy with the  
Xavy is ;L false aiiaIogy, and tha t  i t  is t h e  convictioii t ha t  things are 
wrong as they stand, rather than careful examination of t h e  proposed 
remedy, which is likely to bring about t h e  nominal change. 
We end, then, as me began, with a general expression of disappoint- 
inent with thc Report, except so f a r  as it deals with the  responsibility 
of Cabinets for military preparations--,? subject which cannat be dis- 
cussed here without danger of personal o r  party allusions. The  Com- 
mission might, after their early pages of humility and self-depreciation, 
have left tlie evidence to speak for itself on every point no t  strictly 
within t h e  first half of t he  Reference, treating the  second half or last 
line of t he  Reference as to military operations, as they have done, as one 
outside their competence. Seeing tha t  they have made distinct 
declarations of opinion upon certain points, such as the  shortcomings 
of t he  Militia, it  is difficult to estend to the  Report t ha t  form of 
courteous acceptance. 
While then, perhaps, we cannot well discuss here the question of 
mounted troops (of which they recommend increase, and which has 
already been discusscd in this room), t ha t  of Nilitia, which they decry- 
a subject referred .to tho sitting Royal Commission - or  details 
covered by the evidence but  omitted in the  Report, we can, on the  other 
hand, perhaps most usefully discuss t h e  iiiatter dealt with in the  
minority Report and handed over to the  new Committee of Three. Tn 
other words, wo can perhaps usefully discuss the question whether the 
change at tlie Ii'ar Office, which evidently will be the one direct 
result of t he  Commission, is of moment, and  what should be tho  form 
of detail which it should take, as for example retention of tlie Command- 
in-Chief, o r  merger of t he  present office in the new copy of the  
Admiralty Board. 
Tlic CII.URMAX (Sir Clinton E. Darrki11s, K.C.B.) :-Sir Clinrlcs Dike  
has giren uq a most inasterlr and exhaustire analysis of the Commission 
on the War.% He has touchcd upon its merits, arid lie l ins  dcnlt with the 
errors, both of omission and commission, in that Report. I agreo vith him 
in his criticism on tlic shortcomings in that Report, particularly on tlic 
question of the quick-firing guns and of tho Militia. On one of these 
'The publication of the first Report of the Committee of Three is, of course 
long subsequent to the reading of .this paper. 
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THE REPORT OF THE R A E  COMJIISSION. 229 
questions, the  Commissioners seem t o  me almost to  hare  summed up 
against the eridcnce; and on tho other, they seem t o  me t o  have expressed 
a n  altogether too-unqualified opinion, without taking cridence from both 
sides. T h r c  arc  other points upon which 1 tliink n-e might hare expected 
tlic Commission t o  hare  giren us a clearer view of the eridence, and also 
t o  h a w  gircn us some lead. But. the di5culties bcfore the  Commissioners 
were immense, and taking the Report as a whole, I think there will be 
:I general consensus as t o  its fa i r  and judicious findings. The first duty 
of a body like the  Commission is t o  examine into i ts  own Reference, which 
is usually the  esprcssion of a n  at tempt  t o  reconcile conflicting opinions 
and exigencies which are  hardly capable of reconciliation. The Commission 
appear to have been right in  the interpretation they placed upon their 
Reference. They wcre debarred from the most vital enquiry of all, 
because t h a t  enquiry n-ould inevitably Iiarc assumed a political character, 
namely, the  e n q u i q  into the  alleged want of harmon5 between national 
policy and military preparation. They, therefore, detcrmincd t h a t  i t  was 
their duty t o  discuss what defects in  our military administration had bcen 
revealed by the. South African War. Under these circumstances, it is 
hardly to be expected t h a t  they should have made many important recom- 
mendations. But  they did lead up t o  one important recommendation- 
the creation at  the  War Office of a Board out of t h e  existing War O5ee 
Council and Army Board, bodies neither of which have a permancnt 
character. Indiridual Commissioners developed and accentuated this 
recommendation. Individual Commissioners again made another important 
recommendation, namely, the adoption of some form of general compulsov 
military training or education, the  absence of which, in  tho words of 
Sir  George Taubman-Goldie, was r r a  principal indirect cause of the  out- 
break of war.” S i r  Charles Dilke has cxcluded this recommendation from 
discussion, because it was a matter  t h a t  lay outside the  Reference. I 
defer t o  his exclusion, but I cannot scc myself t h a t  the recommendation 
does not arise quite fairly and simply out of t h e  Reference itself, which 
amongst other things specifically asked thc Commissioners t o  enquire into 
“ t h e  supply of men,” and Sir  George Taubmnn-Goldie, as a reason for 
putting forwa’rd his proposal, alleges as a defect in our mil i tav  adminis- 
tration t h e  no;-supply of trained men for t h e  wastagc of war. But, as 
the lecturer has put  forward the  question of the Board for discussion, I 
mill address a few remarks t o  t h a t  question, though I regret not to find 
myself in  complete harmony with him, nor with t h e  expressed opinion 
of sucli a high authority as arr. Spenser IVilkin~on, at whose feet, so 
to say, I h a r e  sa t  as a learner. The popularity. of a proposal for a Board 
has been cited as a reason not altogetlier in  its favour. Reflecting peoplc 
may, perhaps, be a little alarmed by this popularity. They may remember 
tho advice of Lord Palmerston, who said t h a t  when crerybody was going 
about saying something ought to be done, you were always sure to get  
something foolish done: Well, a great  many people are in a temper 
which leads them t o  say t h a t  something should bo done, and a Board is a 
captivating and easy suggestiou t o  adopt. .But i t  is morc than this; this 
suggestion of a Board is not entirely new; it has been studied from many. 
points of view; i t  has a n  historic genesis in  t h e  circumstances, and in  
thc conditions of the War Office itself. The Commission on t h e  War 
referred t o  thc recommendations for a Board as har ing been made by tlic 
Committee of W a r  Office Reorganisstion in 19001, of which I had the 
honour t o  be chairman. There were arguments adduced by tha t  Committee, 
and there are other weighty arguments in  favour of a Board, which I do 
not think hare been destroyed by the  criticism lerelled against tho proposal. 
VOL. XLVIII. a 
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23” THE lZEPOIlT OF TlIE K A R  C041MlSSIOX.  
I t ’has  almost been argued tliat becanso a Board has xorked ire11 at  the 
kimiralty, therefore it must work badly a t  tlio War Ofice. I do not see 
myself ivhy that infercnce sliould bo dran n rntlier tlian a totally cont ra r j  
inference. It has also bceu said that  a Uoard is inconipctcnt t o  manage 
a war. Looking round, I do not know t h a t  there arc mole instances of 
incompeteiicr of Boards tlian of individuals, but nobody c\ cr proposed to  
send a Board into the field t o  take ckaigc of tlie actual operations of 
war. That  is quito anotlier mattcl-. O n  tho otlier hand, I ~rould urge 
tha t  transaction of business by B Board is peculiarly consonant t o  tlic 
British genius. It has become a so i t  of sccoiid nature with u s ,  and I 
tliitik in  any question of organisation, you have t o  take into scrious nccount 
the  habits and the  predispositions of the people. $ it not very significant 
t h a t  nndcr tlie stress of military operations, tlic War Officc itself 
imniediatcly fell back upon thc  formation or resnscitatioii of an informal 
kind of Board, nliiclt, if rou look at tlio evidence of Lord Lansdomie, w 
of S i r  Flcetnood Wilson, proved of great utility? I uiidcrstand t h a t  
the lecturer uould prefer to I i a l t t  a single Jliiiietcr of Defeiicc., u i t i i  n 
Sub-JIinister for War, and a Sub-Minister for the Xaxy rintler Iiini. 
Sir  CHARLES DILKE :-That rras Lord Randolph Churcliill’s plan ; i t  
xas not tlio plan I submitted. But I would soonzr Im-e t h a t  tliaii a 
Board. What I prefer is, Nr. Bnlfour’s present plan, if lie nil1 reallj- 
carry i t  out, and subsequent Prime Ministers. 
Tho CIIAIRMAX :-I beg tlic right lion. gcntlenian’s pardon, but I 
thought the  proposal was one which had his sympathy. 
Sir  CIIA~LES DILGE :-It has sonic of my synipathy. 
Tho CHAIRXIAN :-It is a proposal which has sonic of his sympatliy, ant1 
lins distinguished names a t  tho back of it.  Theoreticnlly i t  may be right. 
I darcsay perhaps it is the best form of organisation, but you have got 
to  look at the national Iiabits, niid a t  tho constitution under ~vhicli r e  
lirc. I do not myself see how a Minister of Defence could be worked into 
our present constitution. Either he  would be as big a man as the Prime 
Minister, or the Prime Minister wonld have to  be tho Jlinistcr of Defence, 
vliich, with all tlio prime ministering t h a t  a Prime Minister has  t o  do, 
would seem t o  me impracticable. I think tlic prcscnt idea of a Committee 
of Defence, composcd of members of the Cabinet, and otlicr expert advisers, 
under the constant supervision and direction of the Prime Minister, 
possibly meets thc  point equally well, and ccntraIiscs and gives us a 
continnit) of our natioiial policy as regards defencc. I understood Sir 
Cliarles Dilko t o  ask what would bc the position of the Commander-in- 
Chief on the  Board with reference t o  tho principle of tlic siiigle n a r d  or 
niilitary adriser insisted upon bz Jfr. Spciiscr Wilkinson. I do not  tliinli 
inyself tha t  tlie organisation of a Board for tlie transaction of business 
would necessarilF interfere vitli tlic functions of a similar adriser. Thcrc 
is another argument in  favour of a Board, wlrich I do nct r:collect to  
hare  seen anywhere challenged.’ It is this, t h a t  by the close association 
of tho experts with himself, the  Parliamcntnry tiend of the V n r  Officc 
rrould hare much greater authority in spenkinE to  his colleagues or in 
speaking t o  the public. Now i t  has been said in certain qnartrrq tha t  
T,ord Wolseley ought t o  hare  resigned in the summer of 1809, when his 
advice waq disrc,oarded. How much more effectire wo~ild have bern t!ir 
tilreat of collectire resignation by the collective experts can be inferrrd, 
1 tltinIi, from nn instance not pet pas-ed into oblivion, which occnrred a t  
the Admiralty. Thew aro general argument<. There were also particular 
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THE REPORT . O F  THE jVAR COMMISSION. 231 
arguments in  favour of ? Board put  forward by tho  Committee of 1901, 
after very careful study of tho circumstances and conditionsoof the War  
Office; and you will always hare  to  look a t  the  circunlstances and conditions 
of tlio War Office. The particular arguments were, t h a t  only through a 
Board could IOU arr i rc  a t  tha t  proper co-ordination of tiio various great 
departments at tlic War Ofice, which had been, so t o  say, each going their 
own ~ a y .  And another argument was, t h a t  onlr  tlirougli a permanent 
Board recording its opinions, can you hop0 to get  any real continuity, 
either in  policy or in administration. Kor do I think t h a t  a Board with 
tho heads of the  great m i l i t a p  departments upon it, and on which tho 
financial and cirilian elements would also be rcprcscnted--which is prac- 
tically a necessity of our constitution--n-oald interfere with t h e  sound 
general principles of military organisation, by which I mean a proper 
division of the  functions of command and of supply. To conclude, I may 
say tlint par t  of the opposition t o  tlie proposal for 3 Board is possiblF 
connected with the  ides  tha t  a Board carries with it t h e  abolition of t h e  
offico of Commander-in-Chief. But  the two things arc really absolutely 
disconnected. It is true that Lord Eslier. who ~iroposed n Roard, ~myio,;ed 
the  abolition of tho Comm~ndersliip-in-Cliief ; but  if you look a t  
Lord Esher’s note, you Kill find t h a t  i t  did not proposo tlic 
abolition of the Commandership-in-C1iief as n consequcncc of tho Board. 
His  reason for tlio proposed abolition of t h e  Commandersliip-in-Cliief i v a ~  
t h a t  the office had  become aiionia!ous : and ho also particularly referred t o  
t h e  divergence, to  use a mild word, between tho Secretary of State  and 
tho Commander-in-Clii’ef, as revealed in certain debates in  tho Houso of 
Lords. Now, tha t  divergenco has nothing t o  do Kith tlie question of n 
Board; on the  contrarg, i t  soems to  me t h a t  it must ineritably hare  arisen 
from the improper and illogical distribution of functions tha t  then existed 
between the Secretar;r of Stat5, the Commander-in-Chief, and other high 
officers. Tho Tiirks say t h a t  a fish begins to go bad a t  tho liead ; and iinless 
-011 11ar-o n really proper distribution of functions a t  the Iicad of any 
organisatinn, evil must result, and the further down tho eril spreads, the 
worse and the moro Yide it is in its effect. No, the  question of a 
Board does not involre the question of the  Commander-in-Chief, x most 
importaut question which must be argued on i ts  own merits. Perhaps 
I niay remind the audience t h a t  the  Committee of 1901 kept that  point 
carefully in mind, and distinctly and clearly laid down that  a Board, 
wliilst securing tlie Iiarmonious m-orking of all the  great departments, 
military and civil, should in 110 way impair tlie authority or powers of t h e  
Secretary of State, or of the Commander-in-Chief. The qnestion, there- 
fore, of the Coinmnndersliip-iii-Cliief, or tho retention of that  office, under 
any other name, is one for other arguments; but as to the proposal nf 
the  Board in itself, I submit tha t , for  the present tlie proposal still holds 
tho field. 
?iLr. SPEXSER n ‘ I L 1 ; I S S O S  :-:t seems t o  ho the  fate of any discussion 
of the  War Commission’s Report t o  resolre itwlf into a discussion of the  
Report appended by Lord Esher to  t h a t  Report: and as that  is tlic par t  
of the  subject to which our attention has been cspccially directed for 
discussion by Sir Charlcs Dike, I shall confine mrself to  one or two remarks 
f o r  t h e  purpose of esplnining ~ r h g  I find a great difficnlty in thinking that  
T m c l  Eqlier’s propowls will produce so good an effect on  the readiness of 
the .irmr for T a r  as wnuld have been produced by the simpler metliod 
of adopting the recommendations made by Earl Robcrts shortly after his 
appointment as Commander-in-Chief, when 110 suggested tlint tho supply 
E 2  
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232 TIIE REPORT OF THE WAR COYYISSION. 
departments of the  War Office shonld be placed nnder a single general 
o€ficer, in order tha t  the Commander-in-Chief miglit be reliered from thc 
diicct responsibility for tliosc departments, or rather in order t h a t  tliosc 
dcpartnients miglit be co-ordinated, and t h a t  the duty of tlie movement 
of troops should be added to  the  duties assigned to  the Director-General 
of Mobilisatioii and Intelligence, i n  order t h a t  in t h a t  ray the  old ofice 
of Quarter-?rlaster-General, such as esisterl i n  the British Army in the  
period of tlic Peninsular War, and such as existed in erery Continental 
Army, from the  organisation of the French Army in the middIe of the  
scvciiteeiitli century, until tlic organisation of what is noiv called tlic 
grcat Gcncrnl Staff of the  Prussian Army, of ~Jiicl i  tlic equally correct 
and older title is “ department of the Quarter-~iastcr-Gencral ”-in order 
that, t h a t  institution should be properly represented at  headquarters. That 
proposal appears not t o  hare commended itself to  the  Secrctary of Statc  
nor t o  thc Goreriinient, and instead we h a r e  the suggestions made by 
Lord Esher. Now Lord Eslicr’s paper is a reproduction of tlic coiiclusions 
of the  report of thc Hartington Commission, prcfaccd by reasons which 
aro not thosc of the  Hnrtington Commission. I think i t  is a pity t h a t  
when Lord Eshcr adopted t h ~  proposals of thc Hnrtington Commission he 
did not tako care t h a t  the  reasons he gave for them should also be 
consistent with tlie Hartington Commission’s Report. Lord Eslier alleges 
the  success of the Admiralty as n reason why therc should be a Board 
a t  t h e  War  Office. Well, I do not know what evidence we hare of tlic 
success of thc  Admiralty i s  a t  present orgnnised. We have not had a 
serious naval war since tlie present organisation df tlie Admiralty was 
introducccl, and I think t h a t  with n departmcnt, of which the raison #itre 
is t o  conduct a war successfully, we cannot assert tha t  tho department 
is a great  siiceess before i t  has been tried. Further, the  Hartington 
Comniission reported, with rcgarcl to  the  .idmiralty, t h a t  ‘ I  Tho Commission 
wish the  full recognition of tlic complete and individual responsibility to  
Parliament, and t o  tho country, of tlic Cabinet Xinister a t  the head of 
- the  department for a11 matters connected with Xoiir Majcstr’s N a v ~ . ”  
In  othcr words they rrishccl finall- to  lillock on tlic head the  fheory tha t  
tlie Admiralty was a Board. Tlierc were four rccommendntions of the 
Commission. The second was tliat the Firs t  Nnral Lord should hc chief 
adviser t o  the  First Lord. The third was a clear definition of the  adminis- 
trative duties of each of tlic remaining Lords, and t h e  direct iesponsibility 
of each of then1 to  the  First Lord for his own duties. That, Sir, appears 
t o  me to  bc of ritnl importance in any amentlmcnt of the present War 
Office organisation. The 1-ital matter I take t o  be the  clear definition of 
fhc administrative diities of each of the  chief officers. Tlicii they recom- 
mended “ t h a t  tlic Board be regarded as n standing council for naval 
affairs, but the esistencc of such a council in no way t o  diminisli the 
responsibility of the Firs t  Lord.” I think those recommendations of 
the Hartington Commiqsion demolisli that. par t  of thc  argument i i sd  by 
Lord Esher, which is an appeal t o  tlic precedent of tlic .idmirnlty. I 
tliiiik, tlicrcfore, i t  rou ld  be well that. we sliould go back t o  tho Ihrtiiigton 
Commission Report. Non-, it will be in tlie recollrction of those who 
studiccl that  Report a t  the time of i ts  appearancc, that  the real p r c  
occupation of the IIartington Coininizsion a- reEarcls tlic War Office was 
to  make the Secretary of State master in his own house. I think T 
hare nrrer been able t o  convince myself that  they took the natural and 
lorical \ray to  do it. T sliall point oiit Rliere the clificult~ lay: it  is rather 
n cldicate subjrct: but T i d 1  read t o  you tho word5 of the Conimision, 
shich I think csplain tlie matter. I quote from the Report of the 
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THE REPORT OF THE WAR COYMISSION.  233 
Hartington Commission. ’‘ Under the  latest Order in Council, the duties 
of the Commander-in-Chief are to be pcrformcd,” subjcct to tho approval 
of tho Secretary of S ta te  for  War, and t o  his responsibility for the ndininis- 
tratioii of the  r o p I  aiithoritg 2nd pretogatirc in ‘respect to  the  h m y .  
‘ I  While, hoKever, tho responsibility of the  Secretary of State  may, in 
theory, be as complete as, or even more complete than, that  of tho 
1:irst Lord of the  Admiralty, in prncticc it differs in tha t  the Comniander- 
in-Chief directly approaches the Crown as regards certain army matters, 
tvliile there is no similar dircct approach by any tiara1 officer.” I think 
if tlia Hartington Commission had been determined to  make tlie Secretary 
of S ta te  niaster in his oval Iionsc, in t h o  same way as the First Lord of 
the Admiralty practically is, thougli thcorctically he is not, they would 
hare recommended that  t h e  Coinmnnder-in-Cliief and all other military 
officers should be plnccd in  the samc position as na~-a l  officers as regards 
the  possibility of dircct approach to the  Crown. Instead of that ,  tltc 
Hartington Commission recommended tho formation of an office, which 
they call t h a t  of chief of the staff, the  abolition of the &ce of Commandcr- 
in-Chief, and tlic grouping of the dnties of supply under an officer, whom, 
for somo mysterious reason, tltcy proposed t o  call Qiiartcr-4lnster-Geitcral. 
One word as t o  the chief of the staff. The Hartington Coinmission recited 
tha t  there was an officer in  foreign armies, of whom they gare  rather a 
mysterious description. His department xras t o  be s great organising 
department, and i t  was t o  have no executive duties. These are  the 
viords : “ Freed from esccutirc functions, and charged with the responsible 
ditty of preparing plans of niilitnry operntions, the  collecting and 
co-ordinsting information of all kinds, and generally tendering advice 
upon all matters of organisntion, and tlie preparation of the Army for 
war. We consider t h a t  by the  creation of such n central ergnnising 
department, the military clefenco of tlie empire n-odd be considered as n 
n.hole, and i ts  requirements dealt with in accordance with a definite and 
liarmonions plan.” I do not belicro t h a t  that  is a correct account of what 
the office of the  chief of tlto staff is in any army on the  Continent. The 
functions of thc cliirf of the  staff in foreign arinies are thosc which used 
to be t h e  functions in the  British Arm? of the  Qanrtcr-?rInstcr-General ; 
they aro tho collection’ of information, reconnaissance, and the  drafting 
of the  orders for the movrments of the  army in r a r .  In other n-or&, 
thc Quarter-Master-General is the assistant of the  General Comtnandinp 
in regard t o  tha t  par t  of his duties which concerns tlie movements of 
the army against the cncmy, ivatching tlie enemy, observing the action 
of his own army, noting tlic action of the cncmy, and tlie design of 
morciitciits and operntions. I 4o not lino\v horn it  is possible to s n ~  tha t  
tha t  officer has no csecntive fiinctions. It wonld be correct t o  say tha t  
the Qiiarter-Master-GcticraI acting under s commander, ltas 110 authority 
of his o w t ;  he’ is the  agent of the  Cotnniniidcr-iti-cliicf; but, in so far  
as 110 is an agent, IIC i s  the  comntnnder’s agent for the nimt important 
esecutive functions diicli the  commniider Iias, for tlie direction of the  
army against thc enemy. In n campaign, the commander of a n  army 
has a number of functions to. perform. that of directing the morements 
of his army against the cncmy, t h a t  of tlic maintenance of discipline, 
that of the maintenance of regulations, and to  maintain some relation 
between his o m  morcinents and the morements by viliicli his army is 
supplied. I belierc t h a t  in  any attempt t o  improre the War O f f i c e  
ir-liich I do not think requires as much improrement as some peopla secni 
to think-it is very desirnblc always t o  bear in mind that  t h a t  office 
esists for the purpose of t h e  condnct of war, and t h a t  therefore, no 
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234 THE REPORT OF THE II’AR COIIHISSION. 
nrranyements sliould be adopted wliich ivould be unsuitable for the con- 
ditions of war. , I do not say t h a t  the conditions of war 
rcquirc in  time of . peace a Comninitder-iii-cliief ; t h a t  may be 
i doubt.fu1 question. 
mission’s Report there is only one refcrcncc t o  war; J. think Lord Esher 
never mentions xar.  The object of his sclieiiie is riot war; i t  is t o  improve 
the positioii. of the SecrcLary of State. I think the great object ici, that 
we should get ready for  war. Tlic Hartiiigtoii Commission reports that  
“ irlieti tlic country is a t  war, t l i v  Conirnatider-iii-cliicf in the field is a t  
once appointed by tlie Cabinet, and acts wider the ordcrs of the Secrctarj- 
of S ta te  for War, t o  whom, in accordance with the Queen’s regulations, 
he reports directlg. l‘llc fnnctions of the Commander-iti-Cliief thus appear 
to  lapse t o  a considerablu esteiit..” So doubt tha t  must al\vnj-s be the  
case, because the wliolo responsibility for tlie conduct of tho war will 
alivays be t h a t  of the supremo Gorcriimctrt, which, iu tliis country, will 
alirays be t.hc Cabinet ; and, therefore, whencvcr tlie Cabinet has a war 
abroad, it will appoint a Cotiimander-in-Clticf in tlie theatro of war, wlio 
will report direct to  the Cabinet. But our War Office preparations have to  
Iooli a t  mofe than tlie conduct of a distant expodition, and.  t h a t  this 
country may be a t  war with a great Power, and, the navy having bcin 
successful, might be cot~dnct i~ig large mili tnr j  operations abroad. And 
KC havo also t o  look a t  the  possibility of operations nearer home than 
that, and we hare fnrtlicr t o  consider tho spirit in wliich the arfily must 
be t.rained for those. conditions ivhicli tlie Hartiiigton Commission des- 
cribed, \rlicro you \rill have a Coiiimniider-in-Cliief abroad, a despot who 
is tlie subordirtatc of tho Cabinet. Those are tlic ,conditions in which 
crery army must operate, and I hare difficulty in. beliering t h a t  it. is 
wise t o  eliminate those conditions from the totiditions of the  War Office. 
3 am not prcparcd to  assert t h a t  a Coiiimandcr-in-Cliief a t  the War Office 
is likely to hare-I hope lie never will l i n r c t h e  opportunity of himself 
personnllj dirccting military opcrations. His business, I tali0 it, is t o  
co-ordinate tlic foiictions of certain great departments, certain officers, . 
ivlio, in  the field, perform for the commander. a particular portion of 
his duties. Ho has a Qunrter-?tlnster-Gcneral~ ivlio is his agent for the 
drafting of the  operations and tlie making of plahs; he has an Adjutant- 
General, nlio is his agent for tlic rontine and discipline of the  -Army, 
and keeping things according to tho regulations ; he Itas the  depar thent  
of the Jlilitary Secretary t o  regulate promotion. I have not yet been 
.able to  discorer lion- i t  is proposed, if you abolish tlrc Commander-in-Chief, 
t o  bring all those functions together, nor how i t  is proposed, in  the 
abscnce of a Coriirnnndcr-iri-CIiicf, to C I I S I I ~ C  tha t  tho operations of 
such n department as t h a t  of the Adjiithnt-General, and of some of tlie 
supply departments, shall be carried on with due regard to the  operations 
-f the  design department., which is t h a t  of the  Qnarterl~laster-General. 
KO proposal t h a t  I hare  seen makes provision for that. 1 should Iikc 
to  call >-ow attention t o  tlie words of Lord Esher’s suggestion, because. 
i t  appears to  me to make no reference t o  that,. Lord Esher gircs almost 
the  whole of the. duties of the  Commander-iii-cliief t o  the Adjutant- 
Gcncral. To the  Adjiitaiit-Gcticral he assigns the iiiovcnlelit of troops, 
the framing of military rcylatioiis, training, militarg education, pro- 
motion ant1 apnointnients. That corers nlmost the rr-liolc field of the 
Commander-in-Chief’s duties. Then, having put  the Quarter-Master- 
General a t  the head of tho  supply, Lord Esher suggests that  the Director- 
General of Nilitary Intelliqence slionld linrc no eaecutire functions, but 
his duty should be limited to  the  framing of schemes of defence, the 
You i d 1  remember t l i i t  in tlic Hartington Coni- , 
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THE REPORT OF THE WAR COMMISSION.  235 
iiiitiatiou and working out of plans as necessity requires. That  sclienie 
makrs no provision for insuring tha t  the work of those departments, 
nliich will have to work in war, ahnll in peacc be co-ordinatcd with tlie 
work of thc department of tlesign, wliich Lord Eslier appears to  wish 
t o  rclcgatc as  far  away from the practical management of tlic Army as 
possible. 0110 word with regard to the  question of a Board. I am not 
in principle opposed to  a Board; it is a question of what tlie function ot 
the noard is to  be, and of what Board i t  is. The value of a Board is as 
a deliberate body, a body which is able to discuss proposals brought 
before it  with duc consideration, not itself a Board of experts, but rather 
a jury t o  decide whether or not action shall be taken upon the specific 
proposals of experts. B u t  the heads of the  dcpartments of the Xar Office 
are supposed encli of thcm to be experts; and, in regard t o  the erper t  
matters, I believe the  principle of the  single adviser holds g o d .  I am 
not sure t h a t  1 i ~ o u l d  hold to  the doctrine, n-liicli I expressed some years 
ago, and ivliich has been quoted to-day by Sir  Charles Dike, t h a t  ~ O I I  
should hare  a single adviser on all military matters. The principle rather 
i5, t h a t  whcrc the responsible head, t h a t  is in  our case the Secretary of 
State, requires advice, the advice on any subject sliould be given t o  him 
by tho on0 most competent person authorised for tho purpose; and t h a t  
hc sliould not go about, having heard tho advice of t h e  competent man and 
the authoriscd man, t o  Iienr the differcnt views of half-a-dozen other 
persons; but that  having heard the advice, he should take it or le'ave it. 
NOT, I think rou might extend tha t  and say t h a t  lie would hare  several 
advisers, and i t  appears t o  me tha t  the  rational system would be tha t  
proposed by Earl  Roberts-that you group the departments of the Director 
of Mobilisation ?ud Intellig_cnce, tlic AcljutanbGeneral, and the Military 
Secretary under the Commander-in-Chief ; t l in t  all advice on those matters 
and all matters of general strategical design rliould be given by them through 
the Commander-in-Chief t o  t h e  Secretary of S ta te ;  tha t  all matters of 
\upply should pass through tlic Master-General of tho Ordnance, who on 
siicli matters would bc the  chief adviser to tlic Secre tav  of State;  and 
that  your Board would bo the nieeting of tlie Secretary or State, the 
Conimnnder-iii-Cliief, and the Master-General 6f the Ordnance, togctlier 
with ivliatcvcr autliority is to  represcnt finance. 1 can only apologise 
for having occupied you so long. 
3I:ijor-Gciicrd Sir I~I.:(;Is.A~J) ~ . ~ I J l O T ,  l<.C.U, :-In the first place, I want to 
draw attention to  one of t h e  conclusions of the Commission which, I submit, 
is not warranted by facts, 0; even upon tho incomplete evidence taken., 
The report, paragraph 281, s a p  t h a t  there  ~ v a s  a n  inclination on the par t  
of some military authorities to  complain of thc financial management, and 
tha t  there seemed t o  be somo impression t h a t  demands which they put  
forward did not always receive the considcration they merited. Tho 
verdict upon this complaint was the adoption of the Accountant-General's 
opinion : " That  in the four Fears, 1803-00 "-which, IOU Nil1 observe, was 
bcforc the war-" in no casc of real importance t h a t  we could discover has 
sanction been refused t o  any expeuclitnrc which t h e  Secretary of State  
held t o  bc urgently required." Tliis is not the point; but 
have matters of urgent importancc becn refused by tho Secretary 
of State  or the Treasury in  cases of real importancc, so con- 
sidered by the military authorities? I maintain t h a t  they have 
on many occasions, not  only in those four years, but in  t h e  
40 or more previously. Take, in the first 
plncc, mnnceuvrcs. After tho great  Tar of 1870, for the  first time we had 
I will only ci te  ,three heads. 
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manoeuvres worthy of the name, in the following Scar, 1871; we Iyad 
manmurres also in 1872; the Secretary of S ta te  himself, ?dr. Cardwell, took 
an interest i n  them manmuwes, and honorired thein by his presonco. 
Those a re  the only nianccii~res that  hare been held on a n  adequatc scale 
for more tlian 20 p a r s .  I think tliat,cvrry experienced soldier will agreo 
with me thnt  nianmurres are a n  absolote necessity for the propcr instruc- 
tion of the  Army. Will anyone acquainted r i t h  the  War Office deny t h a t  
the Coinmnntler-iii-Cliicf and tlic Atljiitniit-Genrr~il Iia\c. not, year after 
year, maintained the importance of the  manmurres, and tlint an amount 
has from timc to  time been included in  thc estimates laid before Parlia- 
ment, and withdrawn because there mas no money for tho purpose? I sag 
that  is a most important point ; i t  tends to  what I say, namely, that money 
has not been granted t o  the Army Tvhere t h o  military authorities have 
asserted t h a t  i t  was absolutcly necessaq for t h e  efficiency of the  . h n F  
t h a t  the  money should be spent. I will not  go into the question of the 
starvation of thc Intelligence Department ; t h a t  is admitted by evergbody 
now. During the last 30 or $0 years i t  has been maintained by the military 
authorities that  wc should have an Intclligcncc Department worthy of thc 
name, and their request has been refused simply on the score of erpense. 
There is a rery good instance. The Director of Military Intclligence, *Sir 
John iirdagh, asked for Q18,000 a year for ten years for mapping South 
Africa, and was met by a n  offer of €100 ! (Question 5011, Royal Commission 
on t h e  War  in South Africa). Wc a11 lrnoir tliat, ill numberless other 
cases, demands have 6ecn refused, not because they are not of importance 
--sometimes of supreme irnportancc-but because the Treasury declined t o  
furnish the money, not necessarily officially, but  in  tho words of t h e  
Accountant-General, in answer to  Question 78G1 : “ It. is not necessarily 
tha t  these demands are  refused officially; i t  has been probably settled in 
a n  unofticial communication.”. I n  this  way : they say, “It is no good 
putting this forward,” and therefore i t  lins not been p u t  forward. I 
think el-ery oficer of standing is well acqii::inted wit11 t l i n t  fo’rmula. Tlir 
military authorities say : “Yes, of course you ought to  hare it.” I have 
heard i t  myself n dozen times from the Commander-in-Chief and the 
Adjutant-General : “Of course, it is necessary, but what is tho nse of 
putting i t  forward? we shall not got the  money.” Simply becansc of t t a t ,  
many matters of importanco t h a t  ought to  hare been sanctioncd hare been 
refused. I should like, with reference to  t h a t  subject, to  call attention t o  
the  position of the  Accoiintant-Gcncral in relation t o  tlrc question o f  
clothing, when General Brackenbury was head of the Dcpnrtmcnt. At 
Q. 7091, t h e  Chairman of tho Commission says : The fact remains tha t  a 
demand put  forxard by the head of the  Military Departmcnt was, in this 
case, simply put aside Iiy the action of :in oflici:il in  your departnicnt. A, - 
Exactly Bo. 
Q. 7928.-You used d phrase t h a t  i t  rras t h e  duty of the Accountant- 
General t o  criticise the proposals? ‘A.-lT’hat I personally mean is t h a t  I 
claim for  myself, for my branch, the right t o  give . . . . n common- 
sense view of an individual d i o  has some knowledge of military matters 
as t o  tho desirability of the thing or not. 
Q. 7DiO.-The CH-4IRXAX :-You aould be justified in putting a niinute 
upon the paper expressing an opinion as  to whether the propma1 was or 
was not desirable. 
Q. 70G8.-Then, in  point of fact, the  Accountant-General is called 
upon t o  express his rims with respect to  what may be a purely military 
matter?  
11.-I should be justified. 
A-That is so, but  I need not say I think i t  is dolie charily. 
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THE REPORT OF THE WAR COMMISSION. 237 
Q. 762G.--We were told from tho military side that  any proceedings 
with thc Treasury itself would be entirely the business of tho financial 
side, and t h a t  the  military hcads of Departments were not called into con- 
ference? A-That is so. 
I t  follo\\-s that a question of importance, of which the military anthorities are 
alone judges, d l  be presented to  the ’L’reawry by a ciiilian who may be oplibsed 
in  opinion to the soldiers. I desire to refer for one moment to the question of 
clothing. \Ve all know that clothing is unimportant compared with 111arly other 
matters, but this is n typical case, and, therefore, I nieli to mention it. In  answer 
to (1. 1604 by the Chairman, General Sir 11. Urackenbury says: “Our 
rescrves of clothing were inadequate t o  meet even peace requirements.” 
H o  had, in  February, 1699, just  after taking oflice, asked for six months’ 
supply, but “It remained in tho ticcountant-General’s Departmcnt, not 
cven minuted upon until a f te r  Mr. Mowatt’s Committee, and then, some 
seven or eight ’months later, i t  saw daylight again.” The Clothing Depart- 
ment had been, until General Brackenburj’s appointment, under t h e  
civilian sido, and, thereforc, t h e  military autliorities were not responsible. 
He took office in  December, and one of the  first things he did was t o  
find tha t  there wcre no reserves of clothing, not el-en €or peace. H e  at  once 
w o t e  n minute, which was shelved in  tho Accountant-General’s Depart- 
ment for seven or eight months. Surely the  Secretary of Statc, had 110 
known of this great deficiency, would have ventured to  bring forward, 
a supplementary estimate for the purpose of getting the  moncy, about 
$2300,0001 There was no doubt plenty of t ime to do so bctween February 
and August, when Parliamcnt was sitting. General Brackenbury sags 
again, with reference to  t h e  question of carts for mobilisation, ‘‘ Q. 1630.- 
I think I ought to  say t h a t  im had constantly asked for money, about 
215,000, for the conversion of carts and wagons for cattle and mule draft.” 
He began asking on 6th July, 1699, again on 31st August, again on 
5th September, and it was not until 22nd September, t h a t  is, three months 
after he asked for it, t h a t  sanction was given for tho espcnditure of. 
215,000. Of course, in this matter I am not making any attack a t  all 
upon the Accountant-General ; he naturally carries out instructions, but- 
I say t h a t  a system which allows a man, without any experience what- 
ever, t o  prevent the justifiable requests of the military authorities going 
before the  T r e ~ s n r y  is an impossible position ; nay commercial undertaking 
carried out on such lines would inevitably break down. I am sorry 
that, in regard t o  this point, the  great financial authority who occupies 
the Chair has not had time, or has not thoiight proper, t o  criticise t h a t  
remark a t  the  end of thc Report of tho Royal Commission, which I contend 
is calculated t o  give a n  absolutely false impression of the system which 
has prevailed for many years. I do hope the  fcw words I hare said may 
induce a more capable man than myself t o  draw attention to this point. 
I hopo the  system which has prevailed in the  past may be a warning in 
the  future  t h a t  men should stick to  their oan  trade, and t h a t  the financial 
authorities, and especially those whose duty should bo mc+y to  csaminc 
and audit figures, should not come between soldiers who may recommend 
what may be of great importance, and the Secretary of State. 
Xajor J. E. B. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P. (Hampshire Carabiniers, Imporial 
Tnomanry) :-I am sure this large meeting would not wish to be 
detained for long by anyone, least of all by anyono t h a t  has so short a n  
osperienco of public life as myself. But  I think t h a t  probably we would 
not wish t o  separate without congratulating Sir  Charles Dillie upon t h e  
very large meeting tha t  has assembled here to listen to his lecture, and 
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corigratiiIating I t i t t i  n ~ i o i t  tIie great 'interest of the lecture he has given us. 
1 suppose we may say t h a t  tlirougliout lie preserved a studied moderation ; 
itt fact, I suppose we are all agreed that, even the  Commissioners whoin Iic 
criticiscd, oliserved throughout a still greater inoderation in tlio criticisins 
they have niade. I was \-cry ntuclt interested to h a r  the remarks t h a t  fell 
froni tlie distingnislied general who last :iddresl-cd us, on one of the aspects 
of the. case .that presented itself to him, as showing tho conflict tha t  arises 
between important politicians like Sir Cliarles Dillie, or rery unimportant 
ottes like myself, and tile soldiers who fell foil1 of the political authority 
t h a t  refused the supply of money; and t o  t h a t  refusal t o  supply money lie 
tliditglit Ivas due niuch of our  disaster. No doubt; but after all, wliat we 
must reflect npon, and \$-hat I fear soldiers do not always remember, is 
that  tlierc is only a certain amount of iiioney,-crcn in this. rich country; . 
and t h a t  even v h n  you Iinvo arrived a t  the amount of money that  may bo 
spent on our natiohal defences, you niust satisfy the Nary first, and you 
niust satisfy the i r m y  with what is left. That one primary principle is 
so often forgotken t h a t  I think i t  is really more tlia cause of our troubles. 
Coining to  tlie point tha t  the lecturer so n-ell brought out, once yoi! realise 
that  there is only a certain amount of money, and n o t  a bottomless pit 
full of golil into Jyltieli you cnn dip, t h r  mocc $011 rcaliso t h a t  you can 
only spend t h a t  money on the absolutclg essential things, the  better i t  
rrill bo for t.he countrr ;  and in niy Iiumblo r iex that  is tlio one thing wliielt 
we hare  failcd to do. Sir Charles D i k e  pointed out that  ire in  our Army 
have positirely a s p l l e r  proportion of cavalry than any Europcan Army, 
and set. tliero is not one single man ~ I i o  has ever reflected 'on .'it who would 
not say that  n-licreas you may iniprorise yonr infantry in a certain giren 
time-let us sny tlirecl ntn~itlts-tn proiluct. t lie siiiiie rcsult i n  cavalry will 
take at  least six times as  long a period;' and that, therefore, if foreigit 
nations, who liaro unlimited supplies of men, have R certain proportion 
of cavalry, wltich iro will pnt at  the uni t  of 1, rre, with our infinitely 
snialler Army,  should^ hare a proportion of enralrv irltich ro should put  
more nearly a t  6; anti yet Secretary of State after Secrcfary of State Itare 
l~ad  this mntter broiiglit before them, and by none inore forcibly than our 
lecturer. As f a r  as  I can see t h a t  nothing has 
been done to face this clcmcntary t ru th  : that, liaritig oiily a certain 
amount of money t o  spend, and tha t  by no, means unlimited, a e  must 
spend i t  on the essential things we cannot improrisc. Caralry is one; 
guns are another. Surcly, one would hare thought that, with our 
limited expenditure and roluntav srsteni, n-e must have the  rerx hest 
guns;  and nobody denies t h a t  until recently a c  had almost tho worst. 
And a h a t  is the  result? 
A Blnrnnr OF TIIE AUDIESCE :-No, no. 
Major SEELY, M.P. :-The best of their kind, no doubt;.but their fault 
is their age-the date  of them is 1886. Thcro arc, of coursc, a fen- other 
things, such as Intelligence. There is the  question of how m?nx officers 
you a r e  t o  11at.e. I believe tlie nnmber of officers in our Army is smaller 
than in  tha t  of most European Armies; and I also believe i t  takes longer 
t o  train an o,ficcr than i t  docs to  train a man. So I should have thonght 
we ought to h a r e  a greatly increased number of officers in our Army. I 
ir i l l -not  detain this meeting longer, because I take it that  what xre a r e  
here for is to  listen t o  the lecture, nnd only a few remarks frbm those best 
qualificd to judge; but I wokild enter  R plea, in response to  the  remarks 
tha t  fell from t h e  distinguished .general who addressed us, t h a t  those who 
occasioriplly may be cried dorrn for remarks they mako in farour of 
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c.coiioiny sliould not aln-ays be regarded as fmlisli persons wlto Iinve no 
real conception of military n o d s  ; but that when you ask for ccononir SOU 
ask people to renliso t h a t  sineo tliero is only a ccrtain nnioitttt of nionej- 
it is niucli better t o  >pent1 i t  to  tho best advantage on the things SOU cannot 
iniprorise. 
J1aj.-Genernl Sir 1iEc;lsaLu T a ~ ~ i o r  :-I ~.liotiltl ike to s:iy ono word in esplaua- 
tion. I am as greatly in  faroitr 
of economy as he is. I do not believe cstravagancc is the proper xay  of 
inanaging a great arnij-, but 1. bay that. inoucy is very often wasted in the 
Army. At  all ercnts, niy poiiit is only this, t h a t  tlie inan who is the best 
judge of what the  Arniy nee+ is the .\djutaiit-Gcncral or tho Conimandcr- 
in-Chief, and not tlio I~ccouiitant-Geiieral, and tha t  i t  is not real econoniy 
to refuse expenditure which may save a battle or win a ~ a r .  Annual 
niariceurres might liavc saved tlic appointment of inconipctent commanders. 
d good niap of South Africa might have tnadc tlio wliole differcncc in the 
campaign. 
I altogether agree with thc last spcakcr. 
Major-General c. E. \vEnnEit, C.B., p.s .c . ,  la te  R.E.  :-Tho 
subject of this paper, namely, Tho Report of the  JVar Com- 
niission, is onc wIiicIi is tin&ing wit11 interest. ~ l i c  BIUC BOOI<S, 
which I Iiavo carefully perused-and no doubt many in t h e  
room haw done tho same-are so suggestive t h a t  onc does not know 
when to  pu t  t h i n  doirt!, when.oncc taken up. Tlicrc is only one point 
I wish t o  submit to  tlic mectitlg. I do ,not  ask them t o  pass dyer ariy of 
t h e  shortcomings, as regards the  Report itself, nor of tlic Government, 
nor of their advisers, but, siiicc 1890, we have waitcd for an explanation 
on one p o i i i t a n  esplanntion tint we Iiavc waited for  in vain. XOW t h a t  
ereryono ltas Iiad his say, and  ci.crytliing lias been publislied, IVC find not 
one word in  regard to  tho preparations for a possible irar with the  Boers, 
showing that  those irho mere o w  the  spot, tha t  tlioso wlio xere a t  home, hold- 
ing high places in tlie War Ofiicc, those ivlio were a t  tlic head of t h e  
Intelligence Department, and those who informed tliem-not ercn in  tlic 
reports of those who irere in  the country a short time b e f o r c n o t  one 
word to sliow i t  was appreciated br them, bcforo war broke out, tliat tho 
provision for n-arfare against mounted rifleinen in a n  uncncloscd country 
like South Africa, compared n-ith a n  enclosed country like this, must be 
made, in view of the absolutclg opposite conditions. Thc cliicf direct 
aridcnco I can fiiid, wliicli appreciates tlic fact t h a t  tlie mounted rifleman, 
i .e . ,  the  Boer,. is worth trio t o  three, if not four, or even fire, of the rifle- 
men on foot, according to.tlic nature of tho surface, in  such a country as 
South Africa, was giren by Sir  George White. H e  most clearly appreciated 
it, although he says a t  thc same time Iio 11ad iicrer been in tlic country 
before; but. lie liad not been in  i t  ‘n \reek before 110 saw tho difficulty, and’ 
before lie found that  he was in such a now1 position t h a t  hc could not 
really understand how it had never. been brought before those who are 
responsiblc for the teacliing of our Amiy. He speaks of tlic extreme 
mobility of the  Boer organisat.ion ; he speaks of the  power of conccntr n t’ loll; 
Ire spenlis also of General Penn Synions, who found hinisclf suddenly facc 
to  face with a condition of things for ~rhicli no provision Iiad bccn made, 
in B country ncw to  him, without knoirlcdge of the  effect of tlic enemy’s 
mobility, and irithout an appreciation of what t h a t  meant in  an unenclosed 
country. Can there be any question that  .Lord Roberts, when hc quoted 
the  principle of meeting the cnemy Kith massed battaIions-an enemy 
which, at thc  same time, lie admits were .able ‘to concentrate and disperse 
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at mill-must himself have overlooked it, and have acted as if the Boer 
organisation was similar to  our-own, namely, about 16 per cent. rifles 
on horse back, and tlie rcinaindcr 011 foot? If you go through the evidcnce, 
you mill find similar statements one after tlie other. The generals and staff 
when they arrived in  tlie country for tlie first tillie were less t o  blame; but 
they began, some more, and some less, quickly, to  realise the  conditions 
of warfare witli which they found tlieiiiselves face to  face. Some of them 
had been taught with General Clery’s book on Tactics. If you look a t  tlie 
diagrams in t h a t  book, you will find they are  mostly taken from the  G in. 
map, and they depict an enclosed country; and if you fur ther  study tlie 
diagrams you will see tha t  the cavalry, iu the  tactics which lie taught, are 
never supposed t o  leave t h e  roads, except when they found commons and 
opcu spaces. Tlio lcssou was, t h a t  iu a closcly occupicd or encloscd country 
a rifleman on foot is worth two or three on horseback, the conclusion bcing 
that  in  this country tho side, wliicli, liko tlie Boers, mounts every rifleman, 
would be beaten in  a meek. But  there was no testcbook t o  teach the 
converse ! There is no evidence t h a t  anybody seems t o  have studied the 
subject on the clear data  given a t  Colley’s figlit on tho Ingogo i n  1881, or 
attempted t o  organise anything able t o  meet the 50,000 mounted riflemen, of 
which the Boer forces,were composed, on an~-tliing approaching terms of 
equality. The whole of the  questions and evidence from beginning t o  end 
of t h e  Blue Books seem t o  me t o  hare absolutely ignored this one funda- 
mental condition upon which cvcrjthing clse hinged, and to  wliicli all the 
rest was entirely subordinate. These conditions were. forcibly exposed by 
me in some lettcrs t o  tho Tinits in 1899, from the point of view t h a t  it was 
utterly unfair t o  blame any  but those who were responsible for  the entire 
want of foresight, from experience gained i n  South Africa in  the  past. My 
text  then, as now,-was t h a t  in  a country of t h a t  character one mounted 
rifleman should, in  any estimate of strength in  the open, be valued a t  two 
to  three on foot. It has at  last come llome t o  me, on reading the  evidence, 
t h a t  only by degrees, a s  those who r e r o  out there in command‘learned the 
lesson, did they rcalise the position. You may ask how it is t h a t  they did 
not realise i t  before. I at  onco ansrrcr t h a t  they were the outcome of a 
complex system which had grown up in  the  past, that had so entirely 
crippled the voice of any scientific thinking powcr in the  Service, that, if 
i t  esisted, i t  could iiercr have made itself heard. Imagine the military 
advisers of tlie Governmcnt having had the  courage tp say i n  1897 : “There 
is a probability of warfare in  South Africa, in  which, unleas you are  pre- 
pared to waste millions, you must realise t h a t  all our preconceived ideas 
of the proportions and working of the  so-called arms of the Service will 
be out of place-all our claborato and costly preparations in peace for tho 
European system of warfare mill fail us. Our so-callcd cardry, as‘armed 
and trained, n-ill be of little use during tlic first six montlis after debarka- 
t ion;  our infantry can bo efficiently employed only on or near the lines of 
communication; our field guns are of insufficient range in  such a country 
to  produce ruricli . moral effect, and only one coinl~~i iy  of so-called mounted 
infantry per battalion-thc germ of the  force necessary t o  meet the Boer- 
is available.” That  Gorernment never intended to  prepare, or t o  allow 
eridence of preparation, is quite another affair. It has cmt us a liundrcd 
millions at  least. If they had only done the one thing which was possible, 
viz., t o  hare created in  South Africa a remount establishment, Kith the 
call on, or charge of, twenty or thirty or forty thousand horses, they 
could hard l j  h a r e  escapcd the  accusation of preparing for war. In  .the 
same way, if they had prepared in any way mounted riflemen, not cavalry, 
even in  a rery small proportion, they would have been betraged by the 
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Opposition in Parliament; but we find not a single hint tha t  a word of 
advice of such a nature emanated frpm their military advisers. H a s  any- 
one ever thought this one question out ( I  may be told i t  is stupidly hyper- 
critical) :-What ivould hare  been t h e  duration (and the  cost) of the  war 
if the Boers, instead of being all mounted, had had foot  soldiers (foot 
riflemen), and cavalry, or mounted riflemen, and guns and grinners in the  
same proportion ns onrselres-for the purposes of projectile warfare in  
South .lfrica-wliat would hare been the conscquencc? Whether you 
approach i t  from a military or a civil standpoint, you will find the  samo 
answer; and I think coii would see t h a t  but for tha t  one condition, namely, 
tha t  every Boer riflenian was mounted, which was fundamental t o  their 
procedure in erery engagement in tlio open, which was fundamental t o  
their power to continue the  war beyond eren the guerilla stage, as Dr. 
Miller Mnguirc has so ably described, all would have been orer within 
a fen- months. That one condition seemed nerer  t o  have been thought of 
by the soldiers a t  the  Iiend of tlie Army, a110 for years and years had been 
in tlic country, ~ianicly, that  niounted riflemen in a n  open country like 
South Africa nould require mounted riflemen to mcet thrm. 
Licut.-Colonel A .  W. A. , POLLOCK (Reserve of Ofiiccrs, Somer- 
sctshire Light Infantry) :-I should not have rentured t o  intcr- 
rene in tho discussion of the  very important subject before us this 
afternoon, amongst speakers so much better qualified than myself, but that  
Sir Charles Dillic has called.to your attention tlio fact t h a t  I hare. recently 
rcrired the idea p u t  forward by Lord Randolph Churchill, many years ago, 
about a “Board of War,” which would hold m-ithin its single grasp the  
administration in peace, and tho working in‘war, of both the Army and 
Navy. I think t h a t  a fundamental question, which should first be disposed 
of before a e  go in for anything clse, is to  differentiate distinctly between 
the functions of the  cirilinn and of the military officials. It is the business 
of t h e  Cabinet t o  h a w  a policy; but  throughoiit the  whole history of Great 
Britain there nerer  ha5 been a definite policy t h a t  I hare  ever heard or 
rend of. It is tlie business of the Cabinet t o  make up  their minds whether 
they are going t o  fight or not  fight; and if they are going to figlit 
whether they a re  going to  take t h e  initiative, or whether they will wait for 
the  enemy to make the first more, as they did in  the  case of South Africa. 
Howerer, t h e  Gorernment having come to one decision or another, they 
should then tnrn t o  their n a r d  or military advisers, or both, and say : 
“We want to  do so and so; we want yo11 to  provide 11s with a scheme as 
to how i t  is to be carried out.” We then pass from common or garden 
politics to  what wo mny call “strategical policy”; wo hare  to reconcile 
t h e  strategical objects in  r i m  with tlie Gorernment policy, and with the 
naval and military possibilities. This is the business of the expert advisers, 
and not of the cirilians-be t h e  latter who they may. Tho existing Council 
of Defence, in my opinion, is not a successful organisation, for  this reason- 
that  in i t  we hare  the civilian and military members, n-itli the  politics anrl 
the strategy and the tactics all packed into one basket, so that  nobody 
knom-s t’otlier from which. It is necessary to t reat  these matters separately. 
It is the civilian’s business to  say d i a t  he wants, and leare the sailor or 
soldicr to  sa r  h o w  i t  is t o  be done. Let us suppo+ the Govcrnmcrlt to say, 
“We want to do SO and SO.” The officer a t  the head of the Intelligencp 
Department-who shodd be the  first person to  whom they shonld g~+should 
I w  able t o  ring a bell and girc t h e  order, “ Bring m e  sclieme No. 49 or 51.” 
or n.lintercr i t  is. HO should liare in his pigeon-holes ready made, as  thcy 
liarc in Germany, schemes t h a t  would approximately meet almost any eon- 
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ditions t h a t  could posbibly arise in any par t  of the  xorld, or at  any time. 
Occasionally i t  might happen that  t h e  situation would be one not  yet pro- 
vided fo r ;  and in such a case the Director of Intelligence norild reply, 
“ All right, I will go and talk it over with my staff, and SOU shall hear froin 
me to-morrow morning, when I irill liaro a scheme ready for you.” The 
Government, having seen the  sclicmc, might say, “Xo, this woiild cost 
too much.” The officer’s anskcr viould then be, “Very ~rel l ,  if you do not 
choose t o  paj- for this sclicnic, ire will t ry  and giro you another-though, of 
course, i t  will not be so good.” We need thns to  diride the military from 
the civilian share of the  business. The civilian elcment should determine 
the policy, and t h e  military or naval elenleiit arrange for the  strategical 
application of it. The Goi-crnmcnt inust then take the advice given or 
leave it .  
Sir  CI~ARLES DILEE, in  reply, said :--I haro rery little to say in reply, 
because t h e  papcr which I expected would be shot at has n o t  bccn shot 
at. Thcro have been some rery interesting specches made on the question 
of a I3oard and the  Command-in-Chief, but t h a t  is a quebtion so largo and 
open, and there is room for such an immense amount of differcnco of 
opinion, t h a t  you will hardly cspect me now t o  go into i t  again. Our 
views hare  been pretty clearly stated, and perhaps t h e  vicivs t h a t  h a w  
bccn cspressed to-day on tha t  subject have come rather iicarer together 
in the  coiirse of the discussion than theT seemed t o  be when n-c started. 
I do not know t h a t  there is so vital R difference betwep,  any of us 3 s  there 
might seem t o  bd in advance. General Webber has mentioned onc point, 
which 110 thought was omitted, but which I think lie will find is not omittcrl 
from the paper. It is perhaps not sufficiently cmpliasised, and i t  is perhaps 
in the  wrong place, but  I tliinlr. he will find i t  is there. He id find it 
under tho heading of ,Gnerilla. I hare said t h a t  Sir  Evelyn Wood, Colonel 
Spence, Colonel Althani, and others, had told t h e  Gorcrnment what to  
expect. 
Major-‘General c. E. TS’EnnEn :-\!‘hat I said n-ns that  none of them 
estimated the relative ralue of a mounted rifleman in an open country 
like the  Transraal, as compared with n riflemail on foot. 
Sir  CHARLES DIIXE :-I think the two papers of Colonel Spence, which 
he wrote at Malta, and which were sent  t o  this coiintry, viere most valuable 
on t h a t  very point. I think ire must say t h a t  Colonel Speiice did do so. 
and my impression is tha t  (although it is not in his oridcnce) I hare  seen 
tho same thing ill a nicniorandiini by Sir  E v e l ~ i i  Wood. Js regards Colonel 
.iltham, a good deal tending in  t h a t  direction will bo found in the Intelli- 
gence Department Reports, which are  in these roliimcs. I think I was right 
ill quoting those three men as having told the  Government what t o  expect 
on that  subject, ii! regard t o  the raluo of the mounted Boers in their own 
countrr. I do not propose to  go into the qiiestion which was raised by 
Major-General Sir Reginald Talbot and Major Scely; I do not think 
there is anything for me t o  say npon t h a t :  as far  as T can sm i t  did not 
arise directly out of the paper. I quite agree with Sir  Reginald Talbot 
t h a t  tho paragraph to  which Iic pointed i i i  the Commi5sionerq’ Report 
states rather the outside th:in the inside view when they say that it  has 
not been proced to  them that  there are many cnce\ irliere nioiicy, thc 
granting of which would Itavc cniisctl improceinent, has bccn actnallr 
rcfrised. 1 quite agree with Sir  Rcgin.il1 
Talbot that  things are never refused, but the  qnestion is nerer actunll-; 
That is a rery outside view. 
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put ;  i t  is edged off in advance in  the way which he described. On the 
other hand, I think wc shall all agrec x i t h  the ansner which, 11pmi tna 
question of money, Major Secly gave, namely, tliat of courbe tliero is 
no bottoiulcss purse, and tliat all tlieso demands must be set onc against tho 
othcr. 1 was glad to ha\  c Jlnjor dcslj 'S iwlorrcnient, as :in cspericncctl 
Parliamentarian, though a young man, of tlie opinion t h a t  in  this country 
wo liaro too often, although \re spend niucli niorc iuciicy on military pre- 
parations than anybcdy elm, iicglcctcd tlic essentials on tlic ground of 
cost; as, for example, the armamcnt of tlic artillery, and the  increase of 
tlic cavalry, wliicli is SJ necessary; in fact, wc have diminished tlic numlier 
of liorscs when wc SlioU~d have been increasing them. 0 x 1  the  main point of 
311, I have two rem:irl~s to makc. Tlie ono is  t h a t  I fully expected when 
I camo here to-day I should have been torn to pieces, because them were 
some very strong bt:itements in  the  paper which have passed entirely 
iiiinoticcd, in spitc of tho fulness of the  room, and the distiuguished 
charactcr of the  audience. There are a great many men liere %-cry com- 
petent to  tear  me in pieces, and they Iiave not done so. ,But the statements 
arc \-cry strong ones. The statement on the subject of quiclr-firing guns- 
the armament of the artillcry-and tho statement as t o  the report on the  
Militia arc very strong statements, and I am astonislied t h a t  they have 
been allov-cd to  pass without any rcply at all. 
Lieut.-Colonel A. JV. A. POLLOCK :&We all agrcc; but no opportunity 
lias been giren t o  discuss them. 
Sir  CIIARLES DILKK :-I should Iiave thought tliero would have been 
an opportunity gireii for any strong remarks t o  be made on the subject. 
but  I happen t o  Irnow there were not many names sent up as speakers, 
and t h a t  them ~ o u I d  Iiavc been ample opportunity for any further spealirr. 
Then, with regard to tlic question of the  Board and t h e  Command-in-Chief, 
tho paper has accomplislicd i t s  end in the rcry raluablc speeches which liar-.- 
been made t o  us by t1ic.Chairman and by Mr. Spenser milkinson. I hoped 
t h a t  wo might have had more speakers, but I do not think we could hare 
hoped to  hare had more wciglity speakers than the  txo who h a r e  addressed 
us upon the  subject. Mr. Spenser Wilkinson might be espected to  deal 
with tho subject from one side, and Sir Clinton Dnwlrins from tho opposite 
point of view ; one might hare  supposed G a t  one would hare  been entiiely 
opposed to tlie principle of a Jlonrd, and the  other entirelF farourablc; but 
to-day the meeting has seen t h e  interesting fact t h a t  they have been 
brought together, and that  tliero is certainly not tha t  rooted difference of 
opinion between them irliicli tlicre  as. But no one in  this discussion har 
stocd up for the  further principle of tho abolition of the Command-in-Chi~f. 
That lias gone by the  board; no o m  here has spoken for it, and I tliinli 
that  is an interesting and a remarkable fact, because there can be no doubt 
tha t  in the milids of inanp people the abolition of tlia Command-in-Chief 
is tlic main point. Tliey want t o  get rid of the Commnhder-in-Chief ; they 
want t o  imitate the .khniralt~- in having no Commander-in-Chief, and they 
will not rccognisc in practice the fact t h a t  some people tell us tha t  there is 
a Commnnder-in-Chief in tho Admiraltr Board; t h a t  is to say, tllc Firs t  
Sea Lord does, in fact, erercise t h a t  p o w r .  They ignore that  fact. 1 
asked ver? pointedlr a question t o  whicli IT? had no answer : n'hat kind 
of A d m i r a l t ~  Board is i t  that we are  t o  imitate? I ought not perhaps to 
say tha t  r c  have h3d no  answer, becnirsc $011, Sir, did t o  POIIIP extent point 
to t h e  kind that  yo11 locked forward to, and the  one t o  which you pointnd 
isk the  Admiralty R o d  as o f f i c i ~ l l ~  erplninea to us, in which t he  First 
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Sea Lord has distinct predominance and preyeminence 'over his naval 
colleagucs; t h a t  is the  position of t h e  Commander-in-Chief, I think. lye 
onglit to  clear our minds thoroughly upon the  subject, and t o  recognisc 
what we mean, and not t o  pretend t o  tho public that  k e  mean what tho 
public seems t o  mean, 1-iz., a number of 'gcntlcmen sitting round a table, 
each of whom should have an equal voico in  everj-thing. We d o  not mean 
t h a t ;  n o  one means that ;  and we noy understand t h a t  any Board that  
is put  f o r m r d  is not t o  be a Board of t h a t  descrip3on. I thank you, 
ladies and gentlemen, for the  attention you have giren t o  the lecture. 
Tho CHAIRMAN :-I do not intend t o  add any further words t o  the 
discussion now; nothing remains for mo but tlic v e r ~  pleasant duty of 
proposing a rote of thanks t o  thc lecturer for his most able, clear, and 
cshaustire lecture. ' 
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